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INTRODUCTION 
Cell phones.  Home mortgages.  Online music.  Health insurance.  
Vacation packages.  Employment.  Standard form contracts are used to 
secure luxuries and necessities alike.  Indeed, nearly every written 
transaction carried out by Americans today is governed by a 
standardized form.1 
Standard forms are ubiquitous, but hardly innocuous.  In fact, form 
contracts are rife with the potential for abuse.  Their nature and  
universality permit drafters to impose any number of onerous terms on 
unwary consumers, including arbitration agreements, class action 
waivers, liquidated damages provisions, warranty disclaimers, 
exculpatory clauses, and choice-of-law provisions.2  Form contracts 
even empower drafters to shift risks at will, often without warning, 
through unilateral change-of-terms clauses—an increasingly common 
favorite of credit card issuers, banks, utility companies, and a host of 
other merchants and service providers.3  Although essential to the 
American economy, form contracts expose consumers to a parade of 
one-sided, risk- and rights-shifting provisions. 
The potential for abuse inherent in form contracting is intensified 
both by consumer behavior and by market forces at work in consumer 
transactions.  A wealth of legal and interdisciplinary scholarship has 
definitively established that meaningful, voluntary assent to 
standardized terms is an impossibility, as consumers are largely unable 
to understand the contracts that they sign and are virtually powerless to 
find better terms elsewhere in the market.4  Experts have long 
acknowledged that consumers do not read form contracts before signing 
them,5 and have recently come to better understand the more 
fundamental, and sobering, truths about standard contracts: consumers 
who actually read consumer contracts do not understand them, either 
 
1. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 
U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 431 (2009) [hereinafter Horton, Flipping the Script]. 
2. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2007); 
see infra Part II.A. 
3. Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of 
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101–06 (2010).  See infra Part II.A. 
4. See infra Part II.A. 
5. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–
71 & n.338 (1960) [hereinafter, LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS] (arguing that it is conceivable 
to have no assent at all to unreasonable boilerplate terms in a contract when the boilerplate 
language undermines the reasonable meaning of the terms agreed to by the parties); Edith R. 
Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for 
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 469 
(2008) (“People who sign standard form contracts rarely read them.”). 
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because they lack the requisite legal training,6 or worse, basic literacy 
skills.7  Literate, savvy consumers suffer from cognitive limitations that 
render them unlikely to apprehend the meaning of and risks inherent in 
standard terms.8  Market forces do not, as some once predicted, regulate 
the use of the most egregious terms.9  And, as consumers increasingly 
“sign” onto unfavorable and one-sided terms with the mere click of a 
mouse, one can only predict an increase in abusive boilerplate.10 
Despite their widespread use and marked departure from the classical 
model of the negotiated contract, standardized forms remain almost 
entirely unregulated.  The primary, if not only, line of defense against 
unfair terms in standard form contracts is the general contract doctrine 
of unconscionability.11  For decades, however, this doctrine has been an 
ineffectual tool for consumer protection.12  Although unconscionability 
was mainstreamed into American contract law to empower judges to 
openly police unfair contracts,13 the persistence of contract formalism—
with its emphasis on freedom of will and assent and deemphasis on 
contractual fairness—discourages decision makers from inquiring 
whether boilerplate terms produce unacceptably harsh results.14  
Moreover, a surge in popular sentiment against judicial policy making, 
 
6. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of 
Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1993) [hereinafter Meyerson, 
Reunification].  
7. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 233, 234 (2002). 
8. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 211, 213 (1995) (“[E]mpircial evidence shows that actors characteristically violate the 
standard rational-choice or expected-utility model . . . due to the limits of cognition.”); Robert A. 
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 429, 452–54 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, 
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1291 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality]; Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 599–600 (1990) [hereinafter Meyerson, Consumer 
Form Contract] (“[O]nly one party in the typical consumer transaction, the business seller, will 
have the necessary legal knowledge to evaluate contract terms.”).   
9. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1107 & n.22.   
10. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 468.  See infra Part II.A.  
11. Barnes, supra note 2, at 230; Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More 
Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 326 
(2010) [hereinafter Friedman, Contractual Overreaching]; Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some 
Myths about Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1981) [hereinafter Hillman, Debunking Some Myths]; Warkentine, supra note 5, at 
471. 
12. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 73, 90–102 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitz, Safety Net] (discussing the general trend of courts 
toward contract formalism and other criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine). 
13. See infra Part III.A.  
14. See infra Part III.A. 
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both generally and specifically with respect to contract law, further 
works against unconscionability—traditionally a flexible doctrine 
calling for judicial discretion.15 
But the picture may not be so bleak.  Court attention to the 
unconscionability doctrine has recently resurged, particularly as applied 
to consumer contracts.16  And, as courts have reinvigorated 
unconscionability as a policing tool for standardized agreements, they 
have introduced into the doctrine a “sliding scale” approach that, if 
properly cultivated, can empower courts, and increasingly, arbitrators, 
to do what consumers, legislators, and legal scholars have yet been 
unable to do—control oppression and overreaching in consumer form 
contracts. 
Unlike the conventional approach to unconscionability, the sliding 
scale approach deemphasizes traditional, formalist markers of assent.17  
Thus, the sliding scale approach provides decision makers with an 
effective means of responding to the emerging understanding of the 
deep deficiencies in consumer assent.18  Also, unlike the conventional 
approach, the sliding scale permits meaningful scrutiny of contract 
terms on the basis of commercial fairness.19  Moreover, the increased 
and evolving use of the sliding scale approach to unconscionability by 
courts signifies that judges are gradually and subtly challenging the 
doctrinal and societal forces that discourage judicial control of 
contracts.20  Still, the sliding scale approach has been utilized with 
caution, evidencing that the increase in judicial intervention in contracts 
has not run amuck.21  For these reasons, the sliding scale approach, if 
thoughtfully encouraged by scholars and carefully advanced by courts 
and arbitrators, has the potential to empower decision makers to police 
abuses in consumer contracts in both a balanced and politically 
legitimate fashion.22 
This Article evaluates the sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability, defends its use, and advocates for its continued and 
expanded application to consumer standard form contracts.  Part I 
 
15. See infra Part III.A. 
16. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a 
Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 619–26 (2009); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes 
about Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–98 
(2004).  See infra Part III.B.  
17. See infra Part II.C. 
18. See infra Part II.C. 
19. See infra Part III.C. 
20. See infra Part III.C. 
21. See infra Part III.C. 
22. See infra Part III.C. 
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describes the sliding scale approach and its recent popularity in state 
courts, thereby filling a gap in academic scholarship, which has to date 
failed to fully examine this trend.  Parts II and III defend the sliding 
scale approach, praising its potential to align the unconscionability 
analysis with interdisciplinary research regarding consumer decision 
making and to balance formalist concerns about judicial regulation of 
unfair terms in standard form contracts.  Finally, Part IV calls for 
calibrations to the sliding scale approach and its application to 
standardized forms that will ensure its success as a protective device for 
consumers. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY: THREE APPROACHES 
The last decade brought an important qualitative change in the 
doctrine of unconscionability and its application by courts.  
Increasingly, courts are employing a sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability that represents a significant transformation of, and 
departure from, the traditional two-prong analysis, under which strong 
evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability are 
required to justify judicial interference with a contract.  Since 2000, 
twelve state supreme courts have either adopted or reaffirmed the 
sliding scale approach.23  Of these courts, five have further expanded 
the sliding scale approach to hold that a finding of unconscionability 
may rest on evidence of either procedural or substantive 
unconscionability without requiring evidence of both.24  The 
 
23. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007); Razor v. Hyundai 
Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22 
(Mo. 2010) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.); Gonski v. 
Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. Washoe, 245 P.3d 1164, 1169–70 (Nev. 2010) (citing 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004)); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 
A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907–08 (N.M. 
2009); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008); Strand v. 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2005); Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 
A.3d 1044, 1049 (Vt. 2011); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782–83 (Wash. 2004) (en 
banc); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 289 (W. Va. 2011) (per 
curiam), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 
(2012); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 164–65 (Wis. 2006). 
24. See Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 622 (“Unconscionability can be either ‘procedural’ or 
‘substantive’ or a combination of both.”); Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 22 (“Under Missouri law, 
unconscionability can be procedural, substantive or a combination of both.”); Cordova, 208 P.3d 
at 908 (“While there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being invalidated for unconscionability 
if there is a combination of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, there is no 
absolute requirement in our law that both must be present to the same degree or that they both be 
present at all.”); Glassford, 35 A.3d at 1049 (citing Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 
A.2d 648, 652 (Vt. 1987)) (“The superior court was mistaken in assuming that the presence of 
procedural unconscionability is required to void a contract based on it containing unconscionable 
terms.”); Adler, 103 P.3d at 782 (“Substantive unconscionability alone can support a finding of 
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significance of these decisions is underscored when one considers that 
just over a decade ago some commentators declared unconscionability 
to be “a relic” of contract law.25  Against this backdrop, the recent swell 
of state supreme court decisions reflects an important shift in judicial 
thinking about consumer contracts and, more broadly, the judicial role 
in policing these agreements.26 
Most major treatises acknowledge the sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability and its variations as alternatives to the more 
traditional unconscionability framework.27  However, beyond bare 
recognition, these alternatives to the traditional unconscionability 
approach remain grossly under-analyzed.  Little, if any, attention has 
been given to how the courts endorsing the sliding scale approach apply 
it, why those courts find the sliding scale attractive, and whether courts 
consistently apply the doctrine.  While the sliding scale approach has 
been cursorily praised for strengthening the unconscionability 
doctrine,28 little to no explanation has been provided for why this 
“vague[] mathematical metaphor”29 might improve courts’ application 
of unconscionability.  Moreover, just as commentators have done little 
more than acknowledge the increased popularity of the sliding scale, the 
very courts employing this approach have failed to examine its merits.30  
As a result, the sliding scale is inconsistently applied and poorly 
 
unconscionability.”).  
25. See generally, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why 
Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287 (2000). 
26. Some state supreme courts adopted the sliding scale approach much earlier than the last 
decade.  See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990).  Further, 
the sliding scale approach is utilized by appellate courts in several jurisdictions whose high courts 
have yet to sanction the approach explicitly.  See, e.g., State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 68 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1983).  The single-prong approach, too, has enjoyed limited support for decades.  See, 
e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. 
v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888–89 (N.H. 1964); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246, 254–
56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2007); Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 
1985).  
27. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.7 (2d ed. 1993); E. ALLEN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH 
ON CONTRACTS]; 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 2011); 1–6 
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MURRAY ON CONTRACTS]; JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.40 (6th ed. 2009); 1 LINDA J. RUSCH, 
HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2:302:5 (2010); 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7 (5th ed. 2000). 
28. W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT LAW 142 (1996) [hereinafter SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES].  
29. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related 
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993). 
30. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.  
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understood.  The remainder of this Part first discusses the conventional 
approach to unconscionability, and then explores the sliding scale in 
detail, giving much needed attention to how courts apply the approach 
and the justifications for its use. 
A. The Conventional Approach 
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) sanctioned the 
doctrine of unconscionability in Article 2, but did not define the term or 
establish a framework for its implementation.31  The UCC’s 
unconscionability provision—section 2-302—includes in its comments 
a purported “test” for unconscionability: “[W]hether, in light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the 
making of the contract.”32  The official comments to section 2-302 
explain in general terms that the doctrine seeks “the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise” and also directs against the “disturbance 
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.”33  The 
drafters of section 2-302 intentionally left the task of defining 
unconscionability beyond these vague directives to the courts.34  With 
the assistance of contracts scholar Professor Arthur Leff, courts 
employing section 2-302 quickly developed a two-part analytical 
structure for the doctrine, which involves analysis of both “procedural” 
and “substantive” unconscionability.35 
 
31. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (1967).   
32. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952).  Although UCC Article 2 was revised in 2003, no state has 
yet adopted the revision.  UCC section 2-302 provides: 
(1) If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable it 
may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable clauses and 
enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof 
may be unconscionable the court may afford the parties an opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the 
determination. 
Id. § 2-302.  
 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains an unconscionability provision nearly identical 
to UCC section 2-302.  Section 208 of the Restatement provides: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court 
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).  
33. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.   
34. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 140.   
35. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Leff, 
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1. Procedural Unconscionability 
Procedural unconscionability, or “bargaining naughtiness,” focuses 
on the bargaining process itself.36  Borrowing language from the 
comments to section 2-302 of the UCC, courts look for evidence of 
“oppression” and “unfair surprise” indicating that the transaction lacked 
meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party.37  The inquiry 
focuses on specific and objective indicia demonstrating that a consumer 
was unable to read and understand the terms of the agreement.38  This 
fact-intensive analysis involves a range of factors, both personal to the 
individual consumer and present in the external contracting 
environment.  The age, literacy, and business sophistication of the party 
claiming unconscionability are frequently taken into consideration, as 
are the consumer’s level of education and socioeconomic status.39  Any 
“bad behavior” exhibited by the merchant is also relevant, including the 
use of pressure tactics to obtain hasty signatures and the presence of 
boilerplate language buried in small print.40  Conversely, a merchant’s 
“good behavior,” such as using simple and concise contractual language 
or large, bolded typeface to call attention to important provisions, 
militates against a finding of procedural unconscionability.41 
Recognizing that the disparity in bargaining power between 
merchants and consumers often leaves consumers without an 
opportunity to negotiate, many courts also consider whether the  
contract is adhesionary as a relevant factor in the procedural 
 
supra note 31, at 487. 
36. Leff, supra note 31, at 487. 
37. See LORD, supra note 27, § 18:10; PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40; WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 27, § 4-7.  See also, e.g., Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 
1987) (finding no procedural unconscionability where the parties had a twenty-year course of 
dealings, emphasizing that procedural unconscionability involves “oppression” and “unfair 
surprise”). 
38. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3.  See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 
302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393–94 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (finding procedural unconscionability where plaintiff 
had “at best a sketchy knowledge of the English language”). 
39. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3; Brown, supra note 25, at 298.  See, e.g., 
Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind. 1971) (finding procedural unconscionability 
where plaintiff, a gas station operator, “had left high school after one and a half years and spent 
his time . . . working at various skilled and unskilled labor oriented jobs”). 
40. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 4.28; Brown, supra note 25, at 297–98.  
See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding 
procedural unconscionability where the contract provisions contained complex “legalese” written 
in fine print).  
41. RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:5.  See also Bess v. DirecTV, Inc., 885 N.E.2d 488, 497–
98 (Ill App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the dispute resolution provision in the Customer Agreement, 
which was printed in capital and boldface letters, did not support a finding of procedural 
unconscionability). 
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unconscionability analysis.42  However, courts historically have been 
unwilling to find the procedural prong satisfied by the mere fact that the 
contract is a typical contract of adhesion.43  Thus, while recognizing 
that an imbalance in bargaining power, the use of standard forms, and 
lack of an opportunity to negotiate are all indications of procedural 
unconscionability, most courts employing a conventional approach to 
procedural unconscionability will not find a typical consumer form 
contract, which meets these criteria, to be procedurally unconscionable 
per se.44  Rather, the existence of a form contract is one of many factors 
taken into consideration by the court when addressing the possibility of 
procedural unfairness.45  By requiring additional evidence of procedural 
unconscionability, the conventional approach takes into account the 
practical utility and universality of consumer form contracts and 
implicitly presumes their enforceability.46  Only those form contracts 
that suffer from additional procedural deficiencies will be subjected to 
special scrutiny. 
2. Substantive Unconscionability 
Whereas procedural unconscionability targets the quality of the 
consumer’s assent to the contract, substantive unconscionability targets 
the content of the terms themselves by looking for unfairness in the 
contract’s substantive provisions.47  Here, the inquiry is centered on 
 
42. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96, at 547–49. 
43. A contract of adhesion is generally defined as one drafted unilaterally by the party with 
greater bargaining power and presented to the weaker party on a “take it or leave it basis.”  Id. at 
547 n.172.  
44. See, e.g., Fields v. NCR Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (“Given that 
Plaintiff does not claim a lack of receipt of the [standard form policy], Plaintiff’s surprise at the 
terms therein can hardly be characterized as ‘unfair.’”); Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 
72 P.3d 877, 883 (Idaho 2003) (“[A]n adhesion contract cannot be held procedurally 
unconscionable solely because there was no bargaining over the terms.  Adhesion contracts are a 
fact of modern life.  They are not against public policy.”); 1 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. 
CHASE, CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 191 (1986) (“Form 
contracts are not, of course, unconscionable per se.”); LORD, supra note 27, § 18:13 (“A form 
contract will not generally be found unconscionable if there were negotiations on the essential 
terms at issue, such as price.”). 
45. See, e.g., Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 619 
(Iowa 1984) (“[A] finding that a contract is adhesive does not require a determination of 
unconscionability.  It merely alerts the court that the situation is one in which such a finding may 
be justified.”).  See also C&J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 80 (Iowa 2011) 
(stating that “assent, unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power, and substantive 
unfairness” are all relevant factors in assessing unconscionability).  
46. See, e.g., Lovey, 72 P.3d at 883 (“Adhesion contracts are a fact of modern life.”); Hillman 
& Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 461 (“The law presumes the general enforceability of standard 
terms . . . .”). 
47. See DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7. 
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whether the allocation of risks in the contract or one of its terms is 
commercially unreasonable or unexpectedly one-sided.48  Scholars have 
struggled to define the contours of substantive unconscionability with 
precision;49 they often describe the concept by listing the types of 
clauses most commonly deemed substantively unconscionable.  
Remedy limitations, penalty clauses, and price terms that impose a 
significant cost-price disparity are typically cited as the most egregious 
offenders.50 
The prevailing understanding is that courts will not invalidate a 
provision as substantively unconscionable absent clear evidence of 
extreme unfairness.51  The standard parroted by most courts requires the 
offending provision be one that “no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man 
would accept on the other,” a formulation that has remained unchanged 
for 250 years.52  Thus, according to the conventional view, the 
offending provision must not merely be “unreasonable,” but must be 
“harsh” or “oppressive” in nature, or the terms so one-sided as to “shock 
the conscience.”53 
3. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Together 
The conventional approach to unconscionability has been to 
invalidate a contract or provision only when strong evidence of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability is present.54  Specific 
indications that a consumer lacked meaningful choice in the terms of the 
contract are required to justify the court’s intervention in the ordering of 
private affairs.  Nevertheless, even when those indications are present, a 
court may not “rewrite” the contract between the parties unless its 
substantive unfairness is particularly egregious.55 
 
48. See PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40. 
49. See, e.g., Warkentine, supra note 5, at 482 (stating that terms are substantively 
unconscionable when they are either “harsh” or “one-sided”).  
50. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-4; Brown, supra note 25, at 298–99; Larry A. 
DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of 
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1079–80 (2006).  
51. See White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 255–56; FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra 
note 27, § 4.28. 
52. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen [1750], 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.).  See Donald R. Price, 
The Conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of Law and 
Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743, 743 & n.2 (1981) (noting that since the eighteenth century, most courts 
have parroted Webster’s Dictionary definition—“not guided or controlled by conscience”). 
53. RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:4. 
54. LORD, supra note 27, § 18:10 (collecting cases); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, 
§ 96(B)(2)(b) (collecting cases); RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:5 (collecting cases).   
55. See, e.g., Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (Idaho 2005) 
(“Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more 
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B. The Sliding Scale Approach 
The sliding scale approach to unconscionability differs from the 
conventional approach in a number of important ways.  First, although 
evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability are still 
generally required before a court will invalidate an offending provision, 
strong evidence of both prongs is no longer required to justify relief.56  
Second, courts have traditionally reviewed evidence of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability separately, requiring a minimum 
threshold or “quantum” of each type of unconscionability to justify 
intervention in the contract.57  In contrast, the sliding scale approach 
does not require that procedural and substantive unconscionability each 
be present in any particular degree; rather, a relatively large quantum of 
one type of unconscionability can offset a relatively small quantum of 
the other.58  Thus, under the sliding scale approach, the two prongs are 
viewed in tandem, permitting the court to make a finding of 
unconscionability if the overall weight of the facts and circumstances 
favors intervention.59 
 
equitable.  Equity may intervene to change the terms of a contract if the unconscionable conduct 
is serious enough to justify the court’s interference.”).  
56. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) 
(“The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present 
in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the 
doctrine of unconscionability . . . .  But they need not be present in the same degree.”); Gonski v. 
Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. Washoe, 245 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Nev. 2010) (“Although 
a showing of both types of unconscionability is necessary before an arbitration clause will be 
invalidated . . . a strong showing of procedural unconscionability mean[s] that less substantive 
unconscionability [is] required.” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 
2004))); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006) (“Courts generally have 
applied a sliding-scale approach to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative 
levels of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of 
N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“While there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being 
invalidated for unconscionability if there is a combination of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, there is no absolute requirement in our law that both must be present to the 
same degree or that they both be present at all.”); Brown ex rel. v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 
S.E.2d 250, 289 (W. Va. 2011) (per curiam) (“We perceive a contract term is unenforceable if it 
is both procedural and substantively unconscionable.  However, both need not be present to the 
same degree.  Courts should apply a ‘sliding scale’ . . . .”), vacated on other grounds, Marmet 
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
57. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 142. 
58. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 4.28; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, 
§ 4-7. 
59. See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Ct. App. 
1999) (“Although both elements must be present before a contract or contract provision is 
rendered unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability, they are reviewed in tandem such that 
‘the greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less the degree of procedural 
unconscionability that is required to annul the contract or clause.’” (quoting Carboni v. Arrospide, 
2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Ct. App. 1991))).  See also Gonski, 245 P.3d at 1169 (“[A] strong showing 
of procedural unconscionability meant that less substantive unconscionability was required.  The 
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Because the unconscionability analysis—under any approach—
remains a fact-intensive inquiry, generalizations about the doctrine are 
difficult to make.  However, careful study of unconscionability 
jurisprudence points toward the conclusion that the sliding scale 
approach amounts to a relaxation in the application of the traditional 
unconscionability analysis.  This relaxation applies to each prong of the 
two-part framework and to the ultimate finding of unconscionability as 
a whole. 
1. The Procedural Prong 
First, the sliding scale approach to unconscionability represents some 
courts’ willingness to make an overall finding of unconscionability on 
the basis of relatively limited evidence supporting the procedural prong.  
Significantly, some courts employing the sliding scale approach view 
the mere existence of a consumer contract of adhesion as sufficient to 
satisfy the procedural unconscionability prong without additional 
indicia of deficient assent.  For example, courts in California, where the 
sliding scale approach has been utilized for some time, are generally 
willing to find procedural unconscionability established by the existence 
of a typical standard form contract.60  Courts in other jurisdictions,  
 
 
reverse is true also . . . .” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004))); 
Delta Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 111 (“Courts generally have applied a sliding-scale approach 
to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative levels of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.”); Cordova, 208 P.3d at 908 (“Procedural and substantive 
unconscionability often have an inverse relationship.  The more substantively oppressive a 
contract term, the less procedural unconscionability may be required for the court to conclude that 
the offending term is unenforceable.”); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 
362, 370 (N.C. 2008) (“The presence of both procedural and substantive problems is necessary 
for an ultimate finding of unconscionability, such a finding may be appropriate when a contract 
presents pronounced substantive unfairness and a minimal degree of procedural unfairness, or 
vice versa.”); Brown, 724 S.E.2d at 289 (“[C]ourts should apply a sliding scale in making this 
determination: the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of 
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the clause is 
unenforceable, and vice versa.”); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 165 
(Wis. 2006) (“A determination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability that is analyzed on a case-by-case basis.  The more substantive 
unconscionability present, the less procedural unconscionability is required, and vice versa.”).  
The sliding scale approach is also termed the “balancing approach” because of this weighting 
feature.  See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-7. 
60. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007) (“The procedural 
element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, ‘which, 
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing 
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (quoting Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005), overruled on other grounds by AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011))). 
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including New Jersey61 and North Dakota,62 have taken a similar 
approach.  Thus, unlike the conventional approach, under which the 
enforceability of form contracts is strongly presumed, in these states the 
sliding scale potentially allows for a more lenient test of procedural 
unconscionability.  Finding that procedural unconscionability is 
established by the mere existence of a form contract could permit the 
court to turn to the question of substantive unconscionability without 
becoming mired in details, such as the appearance of the contract, the 
educational level of the consumer, or whether the consumer had 
sufficient time to review and consider the contractual provisions.63 
This relaxed approach to procedural unconscionability reflects what 
the drafters had in mind when the doctrine was first incorporated into 
the UCC.  Indeed, a celebrated pre-UCC decision, Campbell Soup Co. 
v. Wentz, employed a sliding scale approach and was cited in the official 
comments to section 2-302 as an exemplar of the doctrine.64  In Wentz, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce a contract it found 
to be “too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the 
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience.”65  The court’s holding in 
Wentz was based almost entirely on the fairness of the substantive 
provisions of the contract, while the only discussion of “procedural” 
fairness was a bare statement that the contract was a preprinted form 
contract supplied by the defendant.66 
Not all courts, however, address the sliding scale approach in the 
same manner.  Therefore, the willingness to find consumer contracts of 
adhesion procedurally unconscionable as a matter of course is not 
uniformly observed.  Some courts employing the sliding scale approach 
 
61. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 96–97 (N.J. 
2006) (“The determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, ‘is the beginning, not the 
end, of the inquiry’ . . . .  A sharpened inquiry concerning unconscionability is necessary when a 
contract of adhesion is involved.” (quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 
605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 1992))); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006) 
(“This Court has recognized that contracts of adhesion necessarily involve indicia of procedural 
unconscionability.”).  But see Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 1 A.3d 678, 687 (N.J. 2010) 
(“Although a contract of adhesion may require one party to choose either to accept or reject the 
contract as is, the agreement nevertheless may be enforced.”). 
62. See Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D. 2005) (“When one 
party is in such a superior bargaining position that it totally dictates all terms of the contract and 
the only option presented to the other party is to take it or leave it, some quantum of procedural 
unconscionability is established.  The party who drafts such a contract of adhesion bears the 
responsibility of assuring that the provisions of the contract are not so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable.”). 
63. Delta Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 111.  
64. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952). 
65. 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).  
66. Id. at 83. 
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refuse to find adhesionary contracts per se unconscionable, demanding 
additional, specific evidence that the consumer did not have a 
meaningful opportunity to read and understand the contract.  These 
courts may scrutinize the age, socioeconomic status, and sophistication 
of the complaining party and scour the contracting environment for 
evidence of pressure tactics.67  Other courts continue to require 
evidence of procedural defects that rise almost to the level of fraud or 
duress before finding the procedural unconscionability prong 
satisfied.68  Courts that continue to apply the procedural prong with 
specificity defend the practice on the ground that a lessened standard of 
procedural unconscionability would result in the invalidation of too 
many contracts.  As the Illinois Supreme Court stated: 
[Contracts of adhesion] are a fact of modern life.  Consumers routinely 
sign such agreements to obtain credit cards, rental cars, land and 
cellular telephone service, home furnishings and appliances, loans, 
and other products and services.  It cannot reasonably be said that all 
such contracts are so procedurally unconscionable as to be 
unenforceable.69 
Additionally, some courts have found that objective indications that a 
consumer enjoyed an opportunity to read and understand the contract 
could serve to insulate a contract of adhesion from procedural 
unconscionability.70  For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
which adopted the sliding scale approach in 2006,71 recently held in 
Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC that a “fairly typical adhesion 
 
67. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 717 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff was an “ordinary consumer” and the defendant a 
“sophisticated health care services provider”); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 
724 S.E.2d 250, 285 (W. Va. 2011) (per curium) (finding that procedural unconscionability 
involves a variety of inadequacies, such as “literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly 
complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting” (quoting Muhammad v. 
Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006))), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
68. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 2004) (“If [defendant’s] 
representative threatened to fire [plaintiff] for refusing to sign the agreement despite the fact that 
[plaintiff] raised concerns with its terms or indicated a lack of understanding, the manner of the 
transaction would lend support to [plaintiff’s] claim of procedural unconscionability . . . .  
However, if as [defendant] contends, [its representative] explained the document and/or offered to 
answer [plaintiff’s] concerns or questions, such facts will not lend support to [plaintiff’s] claim of 
procedural unconscionability.”). 
69. Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 266 (Ill. 2006). 
70. See, e.g., Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 346–47 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding a 
“minimal” degree of procedural unconscionability where the employment contract was a contract 
of adhesion but was written in clear language, arbitration was stated in bold numerous times as a 
condition of employment, and the employee was a highly educated attorney who was not “rushed 
or coerced”).  
71. See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006). 
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contract” could not be found procedurally unconscionable where the 
complaining consumer had ample time to review and consider the 
contractual provisions and could have contracted elsewhere for the same 
services with less onerous terms.72  Stelluti represents a shift in the law 
in New Jersey.  Just four years earlier in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 
the same court held that the fact that a contract was a consumer contract 
of adhesion was “sufficient” to find the contract procedurally 
unconscionable, concluding that the resolution of “certain [disputed] 
facts surrounding [plaintiff’s] signing of the contract that suggest[ed] a 
high level of procedural unconscionability” was unnecessary.73 
2. The Substantive Prong 
Many courts employing the sliding scale approach have also visibly 
relaxed the strict requirements for substantive unconscionability.  
Where courts once routinely required “conscience-shocking” or 
“outrageous” unfairness to support a finding of substantive 
unconscionability, courts employing a sliding scale increasingly look to 
whether the terms are “unreasonably one-sided” or “commercially 
unreasonable.”74  In rejecting the conventional standard of 
unconscionability—“‘such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man 
would accept on the other’”75—the New Mexico Supreme Court noted 
that “[t]he repetition of this unhelpful terminology from a bygone age 
only serves to confuse the unconscionability issues without serving any 
constructive purpose.”76  The Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected a 
similarly “demanding” standard that the offending provision must be 
“‘grossly one-sided’” such that “‘only one under delusion’” would agree 
to it, calling such descriptions “under inclusive.”77 
 
72. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 688 (N.J. 2010).  
73. 912 A.2d at 111.  This change in approach may be explained by differences in the facts of 
the two cases.  Unlike the plaintiff in Stelluti, the plaintiff in Delta Funding was described as “a 
seventy-eight-year-old woman with only a sixth-grade education and little financial 
sophistication.”  Id. at 108.  
74. See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 898 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting 
that substantively unconscionable contracts can be generally characterized as one-sided); Kinkel, 
857 N.E.2d at 267 (citing Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006)) (same); 
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“Contract provisions that 
unreasonably benefit one party over another are substantively unconscionable.”); Wis. Auto Title 
Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 166 (Wis. 2006) (explaining that analyzing 
unconscionability requires looking at the terms of the agreement and determining whether it is 
unconscionable).  
75. Cordova, 208 P.3d at 909 (citing Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).  
76. Id. at 910.  
77. Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 268–69 (quoting Basselen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 792 N.E.2d 498, 
507 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)); In re Estate of Croake, 578 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), 
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Clear relaxation of the substantive unconscionability standard is not, 
however, a universal feature of the sliding scale approach.  Some courts 
continue to require evidence of substantive unconscionability to meet a 
very high threshold, even while simultaneously embracing the sliding 
scale approach and touting its flexibility.78  For example, one recent 
California appellate court specifically reaffirmed that the appropriate 
standard for substantive unconscionability involves “harsh” or 
“oppressive” terms that “shock the conscience,” adding that “[t]he 
phrases ‘harsh,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘shock the conscience’ are not 
synonymous with ‘unreasonable.’”79  According to the court, a 
substantive unconscionability inquiry based on mere reasonableness 
“would inject an inappropriate level of judicial subjectivity into the 
analysis.”80  Another court, taking a similar approach, explained that the 
more conventional formulations of substantive unconscionability are 
preferable to a reasonableness standard because they are “more specific, 
more exacting, and more demanding . . . .”81 
Additionally, courts that have applied a relaxed standard of 
substantive unconscionability have not clearly done so as a consequence 
of the sliding scale approach.  On the one hand, the increased 
willingness of some courts to address the reasonableness of contractual 
provisions may simply reflect that some courts are more inclined to 
intervene in adhesive contracts on behalf of consumers, regardless of 
the particular approach to unconscionability applicable in a given 
jurisdiction.  On the other hand, the recognition that “unreasonable” 
commercial behavior is sufficiently substantively unconscionable to 
justify the invalidation of a particular provision is perfectly consistent 
with a sliding scale or balancing approach to the doctrine.  Provided that 
clear evidence of procedural defects in the contracting process is 
present, “unreasonable” commercial behavior may be egregious enough 
to tip the scale in favor of an overall finding that the contract is 
unconscionable. 
3. The Two Prongs in Tandem 
In theory, the most salient feature of the sliding scale approach is that 
it permits courts to view substantive and procedural unconscionability 
 
overruled by Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006). 
78. See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2002) (“The second factor—substantive unconscionability—simply suggests the exchange of 
obligations so one-sided as to shock the court’s conscience.”).  
79. Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 809 (Ct. App. 2005).  
80. Id. 
81. Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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“in tandem” rather than independent of one another, so that a greater 
quantity of one type of unconscionability could “make up” for a smaller 
quantity of the other.82  Thus, one would expect courts that find 
procedural unconscionability based on scant evidence to require very 
strong evidence of substantive unconscionability in order to make an 
overall finding that a contractual provision is invalid.  Conversely, when 
a contract contains unfair substantive provisions but falls short of 
“conscience-shocking,” one might expect the court to require more 
extreme evidence of involuntary choice before invalidating the 
offending provision.83 
In practice, however, courts seldom apply the sliding scale approach 
with this type of precision.  Rather, most courts that espouse the sliding 
scale approach provide a brief description of its theoretical framework, 
then perform a fact-specific inquiry without ever engaging in any 
meaningful discussion of how the relative weight of each prong factors 
into the overall determination of unconscionability.84  Moreover, courts 
have provided little explanation as to why a balancing approach to 
unconscionability represents an improvement in the application of the 
doctrine.  Courts that favor the balancing method tend to defer to the 
“trend” without further discussion,85 while others explain merely that 
the approach is supported by “a good deal of sense” given the 
“‘amorphous’” nature of the doctrine of unconscionability.86 
 
82. See supra note 59 (listing several cases that treat substantive and procedural 
unconscionability in practice).   
83. See, e.g., Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 346–47 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding 
“minimal” procedural unconscionability and thus requiring a correspondingly “high” degree of 
substantive unconscionability).  
84. See, e.g., Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 165–76 (Wis. 2006) 
(concluding curiously, after extensive discussion of each prong, that “there is a sufficient 
quantum of both procedural and substantive unconscionability to render the arbitration provision 
invalid”).  But see Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634–36 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (performing a sliding scale analysis after analyzing each prong 
independently).  
85. See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990) (electing to 
follow the sliding scale approach set out in the Restatement); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 
323 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. 2010) (“Under Missouri law unconscionability can be procedural, 
substantive or a combination of both.”), vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) 
(mem.); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“The more 
substantively oppressive a contract term, the less procedural unconscionability may be required 
for a court to conclude the offending term is enforceable.”); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
131, 145 (App. Div. 1983) (“Generally, there must be a showing of both lack of a meaningful 
choice and the presence of contract terms that unreasonably favor one party.”); Wis. Auto, 714 
N.W.2d at 165 (defining unconscionability as, “the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of 
one of the parties, together with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party”). 
86. See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 922–23 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
ARTICLE_1_LONEGRASS.DOCX 11/9/2012  10:32 AM 
2012] The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability 19 
C. The Single-Prong Approach 
As the sliding scale approach to unconscionability has gained 
popularity, a growing minority of courts have applied a “single-prong” 
approach to the doctrine, under which extreme evidence of one type of 
unconscionability alone is used to justify an overall finding of 
unconscionability, without inquiry into the second prong.87  This 
variation represents a significantly more liberal application of the 
doctrine.  Just as the sliding scale approach remains largely unexplored 
by both commentators and courts, the merit, utility, and theoretical 
underpinnings of the single-prong approach are also almost entirely 
undeveloped, even as additional jurisdictions embrace it.  Careful study 
of the single-prong approach—both its rhetoric and its actual 
application by courts—reveals that even though the single-prong 
approach has the potential to transform the doctrine of 
unconscionability, it is narrowly applied by modern courts. 
1. Substantive Unconscionability Alone 
First, using the single-prong approach, a number of courts have 
premised an overall finding of unconscionability on the basis of 
substantive unfairness alone.  A well-known example is Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., in which a New York state court found an 
arbitration provision contained in several standard form computer and 
software sales agreements substantively, though not procedurally, 
unconscionable.88  According to the court, “[w]hile it is true that, under 
New York law, unconscionability is generally predicated on the 
presence of both the procedural and substantive elements, the 
substantive element alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the 
provision at issue unenforceable.”89  Although Brower has been 
criticized for its extreme application of the unconscionability doctrine,90 
other courts have similarly found contract terms unconscionable on the 
basis of substantive unconscionability alone.91  Thus, while the 
 
2002) (citing Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651 (N.J. 1971)). 
87. See supra note 24 (citing state supreme court decisions that adopted a single-prong 
approach). 
88. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (App. Div. 1998). 
89. Id. at 574. 
90. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting and Enforcing Consumer 
Arbitration Clauses, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 859–60 (2008) (criticizing Brower for electing not 
to enforce the provision requiring arbitration before the ICC); Leon E. Trakman, The Boundaries 
of Contract Law in Cyberspace, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 199–200 (2008) (“[T]he contract gave 
the plaintiffs an ‘unqualified right’ within thirty days of purchase ‘to return the merchandise 
because the goods or terms are unsatisfactory or for no reason at all.’”). 
91. See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990) (holding that 
a liquidated damages clause was unenforceable based upon substantive unconscionability alone); 
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substantive unconscionability-alone approach was exceptional just two 
decades ago,92 courts employ it more commonly today. 
However, the substantive unconscionability-only approach is limited 
in its breadth, as it is generally employed in cases involving excessive 
pricing93 or extreme limitation of remedies clauses,94 most recently in 
the form of arbitration provisions95 and class action bans.96  
 
State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (noting that if a court 
determines a contract, or any particular clause of the contract, to have been unconscionable at the 
time the contract was made, the court may find the contract or that particular term unenforceable); 
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 910 (N.M. 2009) (holding that the 
arbitration provisions of a contract were so substantively one-sided that the court did not consider 
procedural unconscionability before declaring the provisions unenforceable); Fiser v. Dell 
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) (holding a contract substantively 
unconscionable and unenforceable without considering the procedural history of the contract); 
Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 786–88 (Wash. 2004) (ordering the trial court to  
require further discovery regarding substantive unconscionability upon remand). 
92. See Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit 
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 942 n.14 (1986) (reporting that (at the time of the article), 
“[s]ince 1971, no court has declared a contract unconscionable solely on substantive 
unconscionability grounds”). 
93. See, e.g., Toker v. Perl, 247 A.2d 701, 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (“It is the 
opinion of the court that the exorbitant price of the freezer makes the contract unconscionable and 
therefore unenforceable.”); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist. Ct. 1966) 
(“The court finds that the sale of the appliance at the price and terms indicated in this contract is 
shocking to the conscience.”), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967); 
Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (“To charge them 
$67,000 for carvings worth less than half that amount is unconscionable.”); Jones v. Star Credit 
Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (“[T]he sale of a refrigerator costing $348 for $900 
plus credit charges of $245.88 was unconscionable as a matter of law.”); Toker v. Westerman, 
274 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to receive reasonable 
profit from the sale of a good); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 889 
(N.H. 1964) (holding a contract unconscionable that required a payment of $1,609 “for goods and 
services valued at far less”).  These price-disparity cases have “dwindled to a trickle” over time.  
See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-5. 
94. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-6 (noting that “remedy meddling” can take many 
forms, including liquidated damages clauses, limitations on consequential damages, and warranty 
disclaimers). 
95. See, e.g., Cordova, 208 P.3d at 910 (“Applying the settled standard of New Mexico 
unconscionability law, we conclude that World Finance’s self-serving arbitration scheme it 
imposed on its borrowers is so unfairly and unreasonably one-sided that it is substantively 
unconscionable.”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998) 
(upholding an arbitration clause as enforceable). 
96. See, e.g., Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1221 (finding a New Mexico law on class actions bans 
unconscionable for contravening public policy).  The U.S Supreme Court’s recent ruling in AT&T 
Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), seriously curtails the use of the 
unconscionability doctrine to strike down arbitration agreements containing class action waivers.  
In Concepcion, the Court overturned Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 
2005), a California Supreme Court decision holding class action bans in arbitration agreements 
unconscionable under state law.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.  The Court held that Discover 
Bank was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because it “interfere[d] with arbitration” by 
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Additionally, the majority approach still requires some showing of 
procedural unconscionability, however small, in order to justify 
invalidating an offending provision.97 
2. Procedural Unconscionability Alone 
Most courts have not expanded the sliding scale approach to find 
unconscionability on the basis of procedural unconscionability alone.  
Although a number of courts have suggested that procedural 
unconscionability alone would suffice,98 very few courts have actually 
invalidated contracts on the basis of purely procedural defects.99  
Indeed, several courts have rejected the possibility that an overall 
finding of unconscionability could rest on procedural deficiencies 
alone.100  Other courts, though embracing the single-prong approach as 
 
permitting “any party to a consumer contract to demand [classwide arbitration].”  Id.  For an 
excellent discussion of the ramifications of Concepcion, including the potential limitations on the 
Court’s ruling, see Michael A. Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion 
Covers Less than You Think, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2012).   
97. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 573 (Cal. 2007) (“The logical 
conclusion is that a court would have no basis under common law unconscionability analysis to 
scrutinize or overturn even the most unfair or exculpatory of contractual terms.”), overruled by 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 
(Ct. App. 2012); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 
1251 (D.C. 1990) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965)) (noting that establishing unconscionability requires both that one party lacked a 
“meaningful choice” and that the contract’s terms favor the other party); Kinkel v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 265 (Ill. 2006) (citing Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 
607, 622 (Ill. 2006)) (noting that a court will likely find a contract to be unconscionable in a 
consumer context where bargaining power is unequal and “the consequential damages clause is 
on a pre-printed form”); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 923–24 (N.D. 
2005) (holding that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present for a term 
or contract to be deemed unenforceable); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 
S.E.2d 250, 285 (W. Va. 2011) (per curium) (“Under West Virginia law, we analyze 
unconscionability in terms of two component parts: procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability.”), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. 
Ct. 1201 (2012); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 164 (Wis. 2006) (“A 
determination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.”). 
98. See, e.g., Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409–10 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980) (“Unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive or a combination of 
both.”). 
99. See, e.g., E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002) (“Because we find that 
the arbitration clause in this case is procedurally unconscionable, we find it unnecessary to 
address [plaintiff’s] . . . arguments regarding substantive unconscionability.”).  
100. See, e.g., Commc’ns Maint., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1210 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding a contract enforceable after analyzing only substantive unconscionability); NEC Techs., 
Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.6 (Ga. 1996) (quoting Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 
So. 2d 626, 629 (D.C. Fla. 1985)) (explaining that courts require a certain quantum of both 
procedural and substantive unconscionability); Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 687 n.10 
(N.J. 2010) (“[A] finding of a high level of procedural unconscionability alone may not render an 
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applied to substantive unconscionability, remain agnostic on the issue of 
whether procedural unconscionability suffices to justify judicial 
intervention.101 
3. Justifications for the Single-Prong Approach 
The single-prong approach to unconscionability is in no way novel.  
Indeed, in the seminal case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., the court alluded to the possibility that substantive 
unconscionability alone may suffice to invalidate a contract.102  The 
official commentary to the Restatement’s unconscionability provision 
likewise recognizes the validity of such an approach in exceptional 
circumstances,103 as do some primary contracts treatises.104  But the 
theoretical justifications for the single-prong approach remain largely 
unexplored.  The most significant expositions of the single-prong 
approach have been conducted by courts rather than commentators, 
although most courts that have embraced a single-prong approach have 
failed to explicitly provide any grounds for doing so.105 
 According to one explanation, the existence of especially severe 
substantive unconscionability implies deficiencies in assent.  In other 
words, if the terms of the contract are extremely one-sided in favor of 
the merchant, it must be presumed that the consumer lacked either 
knowledge of, or meaningful choice with respect to, the contractual 
provisions; otherwise, the consumer would not have agreed to the 
 
entire agreement unenforceable.”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 
2005) (“The primary focus, however, appears to be relatively clear: substantial disparity in 
bargaining power combined with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the party with the 
greater power may result in a contract or contractual provision being unconscionable.”). 
101. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782 (“[S]ince Adler has yet to prove a 
valid claim of procedural unconscionability, we decline to consider whether it alone will support 
a claim of unconscionability.”). 
102. 350 F.2d 445, 449 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[A] one-sided bargain is itself evidence of the 
inequality of the bargaining parties.”).  See SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 
142–43.  
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981) (“Theoretically, it is 
possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the 
bargaining process and no single term which is in itself unconscionable.  Ordinarily, however, an 
unconscionable contract involves other factors as well as an overall imbalance.”). 
104. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-4, at 158 (“[S]ubstantive 
unconscionability alone can be enough.”); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 
96[B][2][b], at 557 (“Other courts are not convinced that both types [of unconscionability] are 
necessary.”). 
105. See, e.g., Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1048–49 (Vt. 2011) (“The superior 
court was mistaken in assuming that the presence of procedural unconscionability is required to 
void a contract based on it containing unconscionable terms.”); Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. 
Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648, 652 (Vt. 1987) (holding a contract unenforceable despite not finding 
the formation of the contract procedurally unconscionable). 
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prejudicial terms.  For example, the Arizona Supreme Court, in holding 
that the substantive unconscionability of a loan agreement was serious 
enough to justify non-enforcement of its provisions, explained that 
“[t]he apparent injustice and oppression of these security provisions not 
only may constitute substantive unconscionability but also may provide 
evidence of procedural unconscionability.”106  From this perspective, 
the single-prong approach is simply the sliding scale approach in 
disguise: both procedural and substantive deficiencies are factored into 
the determination of a contract’s validity, but only one type of 
deficiency is immediately apparent.  In this way, the single-prong 
approach may be viewed as an extension of the sliding scale approach 
rather than a distinct approach to the doctrine. 
According to another view, the two prongs are viewed as distinct in 
their content, but extreme evidence of substantive unconscionability is 
simply not to be tolerated, even in the absence of procedural 
deficiencies.  Here, substantive oppression is enough to invalidate a 
provision, and no implication of procedural unfairness is required.  
Thus, one Florida appellate court reasoned: 
“[W]here it is perfectly plain to the court that one party . . . has 
overreached the other and has gained an unjust and undeserved 
advantage which it would be inequitable to permit him to enforce, . . . 
a court of equity will not hesitate to interfere, even though the 
victimized parties owe their predicament largely to their own stupidity 
and carelessness.”107 
This approach views the courts’ role as one of policing the outer limits 
of contractual fairness and is reserved for the most egregious cases of 
overreaching. 
At least one court, in defending the substantive unconscionability-
alone approach, has equated the continued requirement of procedural 
unconscionability with excessive formalism on the part of courts and 
commentators.  According to the Arizona Supreme Court, the 
procedural/substantive dichotomy is “based more on the historical 
reluctance of courts to disturb contracts than on valid doctrinal 
underpinning.”108  The court also observed that nothing in the text of 
the UCC suggests requiring a finding of procedural unconscionability 
and further pointed out that section 2-317 of the UCC, which provides 
for the unconscionability of contractual provisions limiting 
 
106. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 60 (Ariz. 1995) (citing DOBBS, supra note 
27, § 10.7, at 706–07).   
107. Hialeah Auto., LLC v. Basulto, 22 So. 3d 586, 592 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).  
108. Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59. 
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consequential damages for injury to the person, contemplates a finding 
of unconscionability on the basis of substantive unconscionability 
alone.109 
Although courts that explicitly reject the substantive 
unconscionability-alone approach have rarely provided any clear 
reasons for doing so, the most plausible explanation for requiring 
evidence of procedural unconscionability is that some deficiency in the 
parties’ assent is needed to justify judicial intervention in the private 
ordering of affairs.  In rejecting a single-prong approach, the California 
Supreme Court has explained: 
[A] conclusion that a contract contains no element of procedural 
unconscionability is tantamount to saying that, no matter how one-
sided the contract terms, a court will not disturb the contract because 
of its confidence that the contract was negotiated or chosen freely, that 
the party subject to a seemingly one-sided term is presumed to have 
obtained some advantage from conceding the term or that, if one party 
negotiated poorly, it is not the court’s place to rectify these kinds of 
errors or asymmetries.110 
In other words, courts should not engage in any assessment of the 
substantive fairness of freely negotiated contracts. 
The merits of a procedural unconscionability-alone approach to 
standard contracts remain even more mysterious.  A handful of 
commentators have defended the possibility that procedural deficiencies 
could be severe enough to justify relief in the absence of substantive 
unfairness.  According to these writers, extreme procedural 
unconscionability undermines consent in the same manner as fraud or 
duress and thus should not be tolerated.111  However, recognizing that 
the bulk of consumer contracts today are not freely negotiated, most 
courts and scholars maintain that invalidating contracts on procedural 
foundations alone would produce so much instability in the marketplace 
as to be counterproductive.112  Moreover, there are practical barriers to 
a procedural unconscionability-alone approach.  Most significantly, 
unless the substantive rights of a party are involved, the validity of the 
 
109. Id. 
110. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 573 (Cal. 2007), overruled by AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
372 (Ct. App. 2012). 
111. See SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 143; Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a 
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 796 (2004) 
[hereinafter Stempel, Equilibrium] (“Logic would appear to support a role for procedural 
unconscionability standing alone.”).  
112. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 796 (“One at least hopes that most courts would 
not take a ‘no harm, no foul’ approach to such procedural abuses.”).  
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contract is unlikely to be litigated.  As one court observed, “No matter 
how the contract came about, it would be unlikely that a party would 
complain—or a court would listen—if the contract was otherwise fair or 
reasonable.”113 
D. The Promise of the Sliding Scale 
The conventional wisdom is that most courts employ some variation 
of the sliding scale approach when addressing unconscionability 
claims.114  As the above description makes clear, however, the sliding 
scale approach is far from settled law.115  While courts in a majority of 
states have explicitly adopted a sliding scale approach, a number of 
jurisdictions have not clearly espoused this more flexible version of the 
unconscionability doctrine.116  Furthermore, a minority of courts 
continue to utilize the conventional two-prong approach to 
unconscionability, even while an opposed, but growing, minority have 
embraced a single-prong approach to the doctrine. 
Conflict rages within individual jurisdictions as well.  For example, 
the uncertain state of the sliding scale approach was recently revealed 
by an Eleventh Circuit decision certifying whether Florida law 
recognized the doctrine and, if so, whether unconscionability could be 
based upon substantive unconscionability alone.117  The court observed 
that Florida appellate jurisprudence is divided, with some courts 
explicitly rejecting the sliding scale,118 others endorsing it while 
 
113. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 n.13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2002).  See Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A 
Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 50 n.37 (2001) (“If an 
otherwise fair and just agreement is entered into as a result of procedural irregularities, an 
overreaching for example, one wonders—so what?”). 
114. See supra note 27 (citing major contracts treatises that discuss the prevalence of the 
sliding scale approach).  
115. See Sitogum, 800 A.2d at 921–22 (noting disagreement among jurisdictions); Maxwell v. 
Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (same).  See also Stempel, Equilibrium, supra 
note 111, at 795 (noting that some cases require both forms of unconscionability while others 
only require one).  
116. For example, the supreme courts of Alabama and Indiana have yet to consider a sliding 
scale or balancing approach to unconscionability, though the jurisprudence of these states suggest 
that a conventional approach is preferred.  See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 
So. 2d 1077, 1086–87 (Ala. 2005); DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1023–24 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001). 
117. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2010). 
118. Id. at 1134 (citing Bland v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 257 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)); see Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975) (“Of those cases dealing with price at all, most require, in addition to a grossly excessive 
price, some element of nondisclosure, fraud, overreaching, or manifestly unequal bargaining 
position.”) (emphasis omitted)).  
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rejecting a single-prong approach,119 and a third camp explicitly finding 
that substantive unconscionability alone will not suffice.120  The Florida 
Supreme Court has declined to reconcile the conflict.121  Showing 
similar disagreement, the Ohio Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its 
adherence to the conventional approach to unconscionability122 over the 
vigorous objection of a dissenting member.123 
The continued multiplicity of approaches to unconscionability is 
unsurprising given that the rationales for the sliding scale and single-
prong approaches remain largely undefined.  Moreover, it remains 
unclear whether courts consider the single-prong approach as an 
extension of the sliding scale approach or a stand-alone application of 
the doctrine.  However, the failure of courts and commentators to fully 
explain the motivations behind the evolving approaches to 
unconscionability should not lead to a conclusion that these approaches 
cannot be justified.  On the contrary, a sliding scale approach to 
unconscionability can be defended both for its potential to align the 
unconscionability analysis with interdisciplinary research regarding 
consumer behavior and for its capacity to balance formalist concerns 
about judicial regulation with the need for judicial oversight of unfair 
terms in standard form contracts. 
II. SOLVING THE DILEMMA OF ASSENT 
Although scholars disagree fiercely about the appropriate solution to 
the problems posed by standardized forms, there is little doubt that the 
treatment of standard contracts is one of the most important puzzles 
facing modern contract law124—and perhaps one of the most 
difficult.125 
 
119. Pendergast, 592 F.3d at 1134 (citing Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).  
120. Id. at 1134 (citing Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC v. Mahan, 19 So. 3d 1134, 1136–37 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009); see Belcher v. Kier, 558 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding 
that appellees did not establish both unconscionability prongs). 
121. See Pendergast v. Spring Nextel Corp., No. SC10-19, 2012 WL 2948594, at *1 (Fla. July 
17, 2012). 
122. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 2009). 
123. See id. at 420–21 (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting) (advocating for a sliding scale approach).  
124. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 362 (“[F]ew ‘private’ law 
problems . . . remotely rival the[ir] importance . . . .”); Scott J. Burnham, Incorporating the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Article 2, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 217, 217 (2009) (“The 
greatest problem facing modern contract law is how to deal with the contract of adhesion.”).  See 
also Warkentine, supra note 5, at 485 (noting the recent resurgence of scholarly interest in 
standard form contracts).   
125. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 229 (“[T]here is no uniform line of thought regarding 
the appropriate treatment of [standard form] contracts.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: 
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1983) [hereinafter Rakoff, Adhesion] 
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Standard form contracts pervade the consumer arena.126  The 
proliferation of standard agreements follows their indispensable 
character—the mass production and distribution of goods, software, and 
services render form contracts vital to the continued functioning of the 
economy.127  By their very nature, standard form contracts are intended 
for repeated use by the drafter.128  Form contracts, therefore, are 
efficient because they obviate the need to consider and draft contract 
terms on a case-by-case basis, and this efficiency translates directly to 
savings for the vendor.129  The reduction in transaction costs facilitated 
by standardized forms in turn keeps prices lower, thus also benefiting 
consumers.130 
Savings also flow from the fact that the drafter can, and often does, 
effectively shift risks comprised within the transaction.131  Common 
risk-shifting clauses incorporated into form contracts include: warranty 
disclaimers,132 liquidated damages provisions,133 exculpatory 
 
(calling the problem of form contracts “inherently intractable”). 
126. See Barnes, supra note 2, at 233 (“The practice of standard form contracting is a 
universally accepted and acknowledged phenomenon.”); Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note 
1, at 431 (“Virtually all modern contracts are standard forms.”); Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
supra note 8, at 1203 (“[N]early all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven.”); 
William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971, 973 
(noting that the “real world” of sales “tends to be dominated by form contracts, rather than 
contracts that are actually negotiated”). 
127. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: 
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 201 
(2010) (“Most frequently, the costs of negotiating individual contracts will exceed the potential 
profit from ‘routine’ transactions.”). 
128. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 469. 
129. Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedural 
Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 944.  The 
primary transaction costs avoided by the use of standardized forms are the costs associated with 
drafting and analyzing the effect of new contract provisions.  Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract 
as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 376–77 (1997).   
130. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002) 
[hereinafter Hillman, Rolling Contracts]. 
131. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943).  See Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the 
Contracting Process—An Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L. 
REV. 95, 115 (2011) (describing “risk allocation provisions” in non-negotiated contracts). 
132. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 131, at 631–32 (positing that the “desire to avoid judicial 
risks” motivated the use of warranty disclaimers in the machine industry); Robert A. Hillman & 
Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 15–
16 (2009) (“[O]ur data shows that licensors are not reticent to make rather bold claims about their 
products on their websites only to reverse position on their standard forms.  These circumstances 
are likely to mislead consumers, regardless of whether they read their e-standard forms, especially 
if the claims are sufficiently clear and distinct to constitute express warranties and the consumer 
reads the promises and representations shortly before committing to a purchase.”). 
133. See Marrow, supra note 113, at 33–34 (“Liquidated damages clauses are designed, for 
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clauses,134 indemnification provisions,135 and merger clauses.136  One 
of the most important risks that firms seek to minimize through the use 
of form provisions is “judicial risk”—the possibility that a court or jury 
called upon to settle a dispute between contracting parties will decide 
unfavorably and unpredictably against the merchant.137  Thus, choice of 
law provisions138 and forum selection clauses139 are often included 
among standard boilerplate language in consumer contracts.  Given the 
potential volatility of judicial risk, it should come as no surprise that a 
highly charged body of jurisprudence and scholarship debates the 
inclusion of remedy limitation clauses in consumer standard form 
contracts, particularly arbitration agreements and class action 
waivers.140  Finally, the ultimate risk-shifting provision may be the 
unilateral change-of-terms clause, which gives the drafter the authority 
to reallocate risks in its own favor at any time after the initial formation 
of the contract.141 
 
the most part, to accommodate real life commercial concerns by predictably controlling the risks 
associated with human behavior.”). 
134. See James F. Hogg, Consumer Beware: The Varied Application of Unconscionability 
Doctrine to Exculpation and Indemnification Clauses in Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (“The waiver and exculpation clauses reverse the ordinary 
and predictable common law result.  They tend to shelter negligent behavior, behavior primarily 
within the control of the party benefitted by the clause.”). 
135. See id. at 1016 (defining indemnification provisions as clauses “purporting to require one 
party to hold the other harmless for the other’s negligence”). 
136. See Warkentine, supra note 5, at 478 (“[A]n unsophisticated buyer of goods may enter 
into a contract relying on promises and representations made by the seller.  When a dispute arises 
later, and the buyer bases a claim on those promises and representations, the buyer may find that a 
court will not enforce them because of a merger clause in the contract of which the buyer was 
unaware.”). 
137. Kessler, supra note 131, at 631. 
138. See Jillian R. Camarote, A Little More Contract Law with My Contracts Please: The 
Need to Apply Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law Clauses, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 
605, 605 (2009) (noting that firms manage the risk of state law invalidating contract provisions 
through the use of choice of law provisions).  Camarote notes that although UCC section 1-301 
gives a very narrowly defined class of consumers some protection from choice-of-law clauses, 
most consumers are affected by choice-of-law provisions included in standard form contracts.  Id. 
at 606 & n.7.  
139. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of 
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700 (1992) (“The [choice 
of forum] clause reduces uncertainty and the risk of litigation over the proper forum for suit 
should unforeseen problems develop.”). 
140. The depth and variety of scholarship addressing the use of arbitration clauses and class 
action waivers in standard form contracts cannot be captured in a single footnote.  A sampling of 
recent articles discussing the fairness of these provisions includes the following: Christopher R. 
Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695; David S. Schwartz, 
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009); and Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005). 
141. See, e.g., Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1100–06 (discussing generally the many 
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A. Barriers to Knowing Assent and Voluntary Choice 
If any of the risk-shifting terms previously described appeared in 
agreements negotiated between persons of equal bargaining power, 
there would be arguably little cause for concern.  The central principle 
of contract law—freedom of contract—maintains that parties may freely 
enter into transactions on the terms that they voluntarily choose for 
themselves through a process of mutual negotiation.142  However, a 
powerful set of complex and interwoven forces, both psychological and 
market-driven, seriously undermine consumer assent to form terms.  
The sliding scale approach to unconscionability offers courts a means of 
addressing these forces without undermining the practical utility of the 
standard form.  In this way, the sliding scale represents an improvement 
over not only the conventional approach to unconscionability, but also 
over other proposed approaches to standardized contracts, all of which 
fail to fully appreciate the deep deficiencies that plague consumer assent 
in form transactions. 
1. Psychological Barriers to Knowing Assent 
One cannot meaningfully assent to terms contained in a contract 
without first having knowledge of the existence of those terms and the 
capability to understand their meaning and potential consequences.143  
Unfortunately, consumers suffer from a variety of practical, cognitive, 
and behavioral limitations that, working together, render them ignorant 
of standardized terms and largely incapable of assessing their associated 
 
contexts in which one party reserves the right to unilaterally change the terms of a contract).  See 
generally Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (2010) 
(exploring the ways in which sellers use contract modifications to increase profits at the 
consumer’s expense); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral 
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010) [hereinafter Horton, Shadow Terms] (arguing that the 
manner sellers use to unilaterally amend contract terms “undermines the foundational 
conservative theory that sophisticated adherents can exert market pressure on drafters to offer 
efficient procedural terms”); Eric Andrew Horwitz, Comment, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms 
Provisions as Used in Consumer Services Contracts of Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75 
(2006) (examining the application of change-of-terms provisions to various types of adhesive 
service contracts); Daniel Watkins, Note, Terms Subject to Change: Assent and 
Unconscionability in Contracts that Contemplate Amendment, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 545 (2009) 
(discussing assent and unconscionability inquiries in dealing with change-of-terms provisions).   
142. See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge 
that is yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 725 (2008) [hereinafter Becher, Asymmetric 
Information] (“According to the classical paradigm of contract law, a contract results from a 
negotiation process in which the parties freely engage.”); Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS 
OF CONSENT 251, 251 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (“Contract law, both in 
principle and in practice, is about allowing parties to enter arrangements on terms they choose, 
each party imposing obligations on itself in return for obligations another party has placed upon 
itself.”). 
143. Bix, supra note 142, at 253. 
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risks. 
First, contract scholars have long accepted the notion that most 
people who sign standard contracts do not read them.144  What little 
empirical research that has been conducted on the veracity of this claim 
supports it,145 as does anecdotal evidence146 and the personal 
experience of legal scholars147 and judges.148  Consumers’ failure to 
 
144. Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1179 & n.21. 
145. See generally, e.g., Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 215–16 (concluding that 
most consumers do not read contracts at the time of contracting, though some read contracts after 
signing); Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 759 (surveying first year law students 
and finding that seventy-six percent do not read the terms enclosed with delivered goods); Robert 
A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of 
Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 
283 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (surveying law students regarding reading practices and concluding 
that only four percent to thirteen percent actually read the terms of online contracts); Daniel 
Keating, Measuring Sales Law Against Sales Practice: A Reality Check, 17 J.L. & COM. 99, 106 
(1982) (describing extensive interviews with over a dozen buyers and sellers in which “virtually 
none” read the contract beyond the key terms); Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms 
in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2703–04 (2000) (detailing interviews of twenty-five companies 
in which half stated they believed the other side in the contract process never or rarely read the 
standard forms); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56–62 (1963) (discussing a study of 1960s businessmen that addressed 
informal contracting practices and stating that most purchasing agents do not read the “fine print” 
of standard contracts); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical 
Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256 (1970) (describing a survey of 100 residential tenants in 
Michigan that revealed that only fifty-seven percent actually read the entirety of their lease 
agreement); John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 778–79 & n.207 (1982) [hereinafter Murray, 
Standardized Agreement] (noting that the author conducted seminars with over 5000 purchasing 
agents and had “never discovered one who read or understood printed terms”); Debra Pogrund 
Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite 
Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 617, 628 (2009) (surveying law students 
and members of the public and concluding that “a sizeable number of consumers fail to read the 
contracts that they sign”).  
146. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reporting that 
AT&T found that only 30% percent of its customers would read its entire form agreement 
updating contract terms, 10% would not read it at all, and 25% would throw away the mailing 
without even opening it), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2003).   
147. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 358 (“Personally, I neither read most of the 
contracts that I sign nor know anyone who does.  I do not believe that this makes me unusually 
irrational, particularly stupid, or unreasonably lazy.”); American4FinanReform, Elizabeth Warren 
Defends the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, YOUTUBE (July 17, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYd08e5Cjvs&feature=player_embedded (“I teach contract 
law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half of what [a credit card contract] says.”).   
148. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the 
Computer Fine Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 7:17 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/ (“It has, ‘the 
smallest type you can imagine and you unfold it like a map,’ he said. ‘It is a problem,’ he added, 
‘because the legal system obviously is to blame for that.’”); David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually 
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read the contracts that they sign is not necessarily irresponsible.  In fact, 
scholars recognize that form contracts are designed not to be read,149 
and thus maintain that consumers’ failure to read is an effect of 
“rational ignorance”—the irrationality of reading standardized 
agreements when the costs of reading outweigh the risks of failing to do 
so.150  Many factors point away from the rationality of reading.  Form 
contracts are typically difficult to read, as they are often lengthy and 
printed in small type.151  Consumers are well aware that they will likely 
not understand the contracts that they sign.  Thus, they are largely 
discouraged from expending the effort required to carefully review the 
fine print.152  Moreover, the futility of reading is underscored by 
consumers’ cognizance that they are generally powerless to negotiate 
standard terms.153  Furthermore, the contracting environment often 
makes reading less likely; already hurried consumers are rushed through 
the contracting process and made to feel as though careful review of the 
provisions is socially inappropriate.154  As a result, many consumers are 
reluctant to carefully scrutinize boilerplate contract language at the time 
of signing for fear of appearing awkward or confrontational.155 
The failure of consumers to read standardized terms is highly 
problematic, but is only one of many forces that influence consumer 
assent to those provisions.  For instance, experts have discovered that 
many consumers lack the legal156 and financial157 literacy to navigate 
 
Read Boilerplate Contracts?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actually-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-
posner-doesnt-do-you/ (“For my home equity loan, I got 100s of pages of documentation; I didn’t 
read, I just signed.”). 
149. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 31, at 504. 
150. See Peter A. Alces, Guerrilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1529–30 & n.60 (2007) 
[hereinafter Alces, Guerrilla Terms] (“[T]he ‘search’ cost of discovering the higher price and 
greater risk is too great given the benefit the buyer imagines she would derive from discovering 
the cost.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 832 (2006) (arguing the cost imposed on consumers 
in gaining information may exceed the benefit, resulting in consumers’ rational ignorance); 
Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 243 (“Where form contracts involve a low dollar value of 
performance, the cost of thorough search and deliberation on preprinted terms, let alone the cost 
of legal advice about the meaning and effect of the terms, will usually be prohibitive in relation to 
the benefits.”).  See also Prentice, supra note 147, at 358–62 (arguing that given high information 
costs and time constraints, failure to read boilerplate constitutes rational, rather than irrational, 
behavior). 
151. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 731. 
152. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 446. 
153. Id.  See Prentice, supra note 147, at 361 (arguing that there is little benefit from reading 
boilerplate because the seller’s agent is typically powerless to alter the terms of the deal). 
154. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 448. 
155. Id. at 448–49. 
156. Meyerson, Consumer Form Contract, supra note 8, at 598. 
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complex standard contracts, which are often filled with technical jargon 
and “legalese.”158  Other researchers have uncovered a more alarming 
fact—most American consumers lack the basic reading skills to 
understand the contracts that they sign.159  One commentator, reviewing 
a recent study of U.S. Department of Education data concerning literacy 
rates, concluded that 96% to 97% of all American adults lack the basic 
literacy skills required to understand consumer standard form contracts 
of even moderate complexity.160  Put differently, only 3% to 4% of the 
population can understand the basic, everyday contracts that they 
sign.161  This data illustrates that “[t]he degree of literacy required to 
comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply 
is not within the reach of the majority of American adults.”162  The 
rising number of American consumers for whom English is a second 
language often face even greater difficulty grasping the full meaning of 
 
157. See Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household Financial Management: The 
Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, in FED. RES. BULL. 309 (July 2003) (analyzing 
consumer survey research on household financial-management practices); Matthew A. Edwards, 
Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest 
for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 232 (2005) (questioning whether 
consumers are sufficiently educated or well-informed “to comparison shop for credit”); Jinkook 
Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of APRs and 
Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70, 74–75 (1999) (discussing a study 
in which only ten percent of closed-end mortgage borrowers understood the relationship between 
the contract interest rate and the APR).  See generally William R. Emmons, Consumer-Finance 
Myths and Other Obstacles to Financial Literacy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335 (2005) 
(exploring skills needed for financial literacy, the myths of consumer finance, and obstacles to 
achieving widespread financial literacy).  
158. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 59 (2001) (discussing the manner and complexity in which legal terminology is used in 
contracts). 
159. See Edwards, supra note 157, at 232 (addressing “general literacy and educational 
problems” that limit consumer understanding); Melvin A. Einsenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 305, 309 (1986) (“The average consumer knows that he probably will be unable to fully 
understand the dense text of a form contract, either term-by-term or as an integrated whole.”).   
See also Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing but 
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 208 (2008) (citing 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND 
FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMERS 38 (2006), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf) (“Only slightly more than half the adult U.S. 
population can read above an eighth grade level.”); White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 234 
(“New research measuring the literacy of the U.S. population demonstrates that even consumers 
who might take the time and trouble to ‘read’ contemporary consumer contract documents are 
unlikely to understand them.”).  
160. Barnes, supra note 2, at 261–62 (citing White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 237–38).   
161. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 712 (2011).  Ben-Shahar and Schneider also review rates of innumeracy revealing 
that most people have serious difficulties performing simple mathematical operations.  Id. 
162. White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 239. 
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contract provisions.163 
Furthermore, psychologists who study consumer cognition and 
decision making have demonstrated that consumers suffer from a range 
of limitations on their capability to understand the risks inherent in 
contracting.164  Even assuming that consumers are willing and able to 
read form contracts, they are highly unlikely to understand their 
contents.  According to the theory of “bounded rationality,” consumers 
suffer from limitations on their time, financial resources, available 
memory, and cognitive powers that combine to prevent a perfect or 
“optimal” decision in the contracting process.165  Consumers tend not to 
invest in an exhaustive process of acquiring and understanding 
information about the risks of standardized terms, but rather are 
satisfied by a limited—and often inadequate—search for information 
about contractual risks.166  After an incomplete information search, 
consumers often base their decisions about whether to contract on a 
limited number of factors, such as price and product characteristics.167  
Moreover, consumers tend to underestimate the possibility of negative 
consequences resulting from their actions and ignore what they perceive 
to be low-probability risks.168  Together with numerous other consumer 
 
163. Edwards, supra note 157, at 232 (citing Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for 
Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
1027, 1075–77 (1995)). 
164. Barnes, supra note 2, at 254 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 213); Hillman & 
Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 445–54; Marrow, supra note 113, at 57. 
165. Barnes, supra note 2, at 254–55 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 214); Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, supra note 8, at 1222–25. 
166. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 451–53.  Empirical evidence demonstrates that 
this behavior, known as “satisficing,” is a poor substitute for fully informed, rational decision 
making.  See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1481, 1531 (2006) (“Cognitive experiments demonstrate that individuals adopt time-saving 
strategies in order to simplify complex decisionmaking. . . .  Some of these shortcuts 
systematically color and bias the decisions that individuals reach and undercut the notion that 
consumers should be modeled as rational actors.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1111–13 (2000) (explaining that boilerplate is difficult to contract around 
because contracting parties see default terms as part of the “status quo” and therefore, all else 
being equal, prefer them to alternate terms).  See also Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision 
Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 507 (1979) (explaining that people 
often reach decisions based on a “search of only a tiny part” of the total available information).  
Simon is credited with coining the term “satisficing.”  Id. 
167. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 451–53. 
168. Barnes, supra note 2, at 257–59; Marrow, supra note 113, at 63–66.  This effect results 
from the operation of the “availability” heuristic, according to which consumers assess the 
probability of an event by reference to similar events, and the “representativeness” heuristic, 
according to which the probability of an event is evaluated by its familiarity.  For further 
discussion of heuristics that influence decision making, see Richard A. Hasen, Efficiency Under 
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tendencies identified by cognitive psychologists,169 these limitations 
render most consumers incapable of meaningfully assenting to the risks 
imposed by standard contract provisions.170 
Finally, a number of scholars predict that online contracting will 
exacerbate rather than improve these cognitive barriers to meaningful 
assent.171  Many of the perceived “benefits” of online contracting—for 
example, the fact that consumers have additional time to gather 
information and review contract provisions—are undermined by the 
same cognitive limitations that operate on consumers in traditional 
settings.172  First, most cognitive limitations are largely “internal to 
consumers” rather than a product of the contracting environment.173  
Moreover, the online contracting environment contains a number of 
specific features that may significantly undermine consumers’ access to, 
and understanding of, standard form provisions.  The location of 
contract terms in hyperlinks unlikely to be accessed by consumers is 
one such feature, as is the lack of any live interaction with a 
representative of the merchant during the contracting process.174  In 
some cases, contract terms are not supplied to the consumer until after 
the consumer enters into the contract.  Although consumers are 
generally cognizant of the importance of affixing their signatures to 
paper contracts, it is unclear whether clicking “I agree” denotes the 
same level of solemnity for Internet consumers.175 
 
Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 395–96 
(1990); Marrow, supra note 113, at 63–66. 
169. The literature covering the cognitive limitations that effect contracting behavior is vast.  
This Article merely attempts to highlight some cognitive effects that impede meaningful assent to 
standard form contracts.  For a more complete discussion of such limitations, see Cass. R. 
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).   
170. Psychologists who study judgment and choice acknowledge that all consumers do not 
suffer from identical cognitive vulnerabilities; rather, individuals’ cognitive and decision making 
abilities vary.  However, experimental evidence tends to show that individuals’ cognitive 
abilities, expertise levels, and demographic variables such as race, sex, and age do not predictably 
influence the quality of decision making.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual 
Differences, and Paternalism, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 125, 125–26 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon 
& Michael Freeman eds., 2006).   
171. See, e.g., Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1554 (“[T]echnology will lead to 
more rather than less obfuscation by ‘streamlining’ the contract formation process and 
encouraging the proliferation of more settings in which constructive consent will suffice.”). 
172. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 484–85.   
173. Id.  
174. Id. at 464–68; Hillman & Barakat, supra note 132, at 13–15.   
175. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 480–81 (“[O]vereager, ‘click-happy’ e-
consumers may engage in impulse purchasing without investigating standard terms at all.”); 
Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of 
Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 408, 418–32 (2010) (describing how passive users of online 
content are often unwittingly bound by terms in user agreements). 
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2. Market-Based Barriers to Voluntariness 
The cognitive and psychological factors described above seriously 
affect consumer decision making, but they are not solely to blame for 
the poor quality of consumer assent to standardized forms.  Market 
forces also undermine consumers’ voluntary choice with respect to form 
terms.176  Consumer form contracts are “contracts of adhesion,” drafted 
unilaterally by the party with greater bargaining power and presented on 
a “take it or leave it” basis.177  The adhesive quality of standard form 
contracts is inextricably tied to their utility—the drafter loses much of 
the efficiency of pre-drafting and pre-printing a standard contract if the 
individual terms are later renegotiated.178  Further, in view of the 
objective theory of contract formation and the so-called “duty to read,” 
form contracts generally meet the traditional requirements for 
enforceability, provided they are supported by objective indicia of 
assent.179  The profound disparity in bargaining power present in 
contracts of adhesion prevents consumers from negotiating their 
content.180  Thus, consumers routinely sign form contracts without 
meaningfully assenting to standardized terms contained within.181 
What about reasonable alternatives offered by other firms in the 
marketplace?  Assuming that some consumers will successfully access 
and fully comprehend standardized provisions, does the marketplace 
 
176. Bix, supra note 142, at 254. 
177. Kessler, supra note 131, at 632.  See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (applying, for the first time, the term 
“adhesion” to a form contract).  Although some experts in the past have maintained that form 
contracts are not necessarily adhesionary, both courts and commentators increasingly have 
recognized that practically all contracts signed by consumers are not only standard in form, but 
are also adhesionary.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) 
(“[T]he times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”); 
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27A, at 155 (rev. ed. Supp. 2008) 
[hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS] (“[T]he bulk of contracts signed in this country are 
adhesion contracts.”). 
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 102 (2007); Horton, Flipping 
the Script, supra note 1, at 474.   
179. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 341–
42 (1974). 
180. See Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1099–102 (discussing the impact of unilateral 
change-of-terms agreements on the already disparate parties’ bargaining power); Morant, supra 
note 129, at 944–45 (noting that because the advantaged party often drafts the preformed contract, 
it may “prejudice the interests of the more disadvantaged party”). 
181. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (“[I]n the usual case, the consumer never 
even reads the form, or reads it only after he has become bound by its terms.”).  See generally 
David D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 208–22 (2005) 
(discussing whether disparities in bargaining power leave meaningful opportunities for 
negotiation). 
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offer consumers a choice of standardized terms from which they can 
select?  Economists once predicted that market forces would regulate 
standardized forms, particularly those containing extremely one-sided 
and risk-shifting terms.182  According to the theory of “market assent,” 
the form terms used by merchants would be influenced by a small 
proportion of informed consumers who read standardized agreements 
and shopped for favorable standard terms.183  Firms would then 
compete for market share by omitting onerous terms or even including 
more favorable ones.184  Proponents of this view hypothesized that 
firms are sensitive to their market reputations and thus will not impose 
onerous terms at the risk of driving away their customer base.185 
However, recent contributions to economic theory suggest that the 
model of the self-regulating market is false.186  Even savvy, informed 
consumers suffer from biases and cognition limits that render them 
unlikely (at best) or incapable (at worst) to consider the ramifications of 
 
182. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of the Bargain: An Economic Theory of How 
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 862–63 (2006) (“Regardless of whether any particular consumer had 
ever read, understood, or bargained over the terms of the standard form, informed consumers 
generated a form of hypothetical market assent, which would bind all consumers.”); George L. 
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1299–302 (1981) 
(noting general trends in contract content over time); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect 
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 
69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1391–92 (1983) (explaining the effect that significantly informed 
consumers can have on market forces); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets 
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 
672 (1979) (addressing the impact consumer actions may have on market competition); Alan 
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1065–67 
(1977) (discussing the immense advantages sellers currently have over consumers and courts 
when ascertaining the fairness of standardized forms).  See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling 
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679 (discussing reasonable alternatives to 
current standardized contract provisions). 
183. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 205 n.22; Johnston, supra note 182, at 862–
63. 
184. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 843 (2006) [hereinafter Hillman, Online 
Boilerplate]. 
185. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 150, at 827.   
186. Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1523 (citing Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 
121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006)); Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 199, 214; Ted Cruz & 
Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for 
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638–40 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis 
of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 843 (2003).  See 
Korobkin, supra note 8, at 1212 (arguing that because contract terms may not enter buyers’ 
decision making processes, drafting parties may have an incentive to include inefficient contract 
terms in standard forms).  
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most risk-shifting provisions.187  Because standardized terms do not 
influence consumer behavior, drafters have little incentive to compete 
on the basis of those provisions.188  Thus, the forms utilized by 
competing suppliers of goods and services remain largely uniform,189 
rendering consumers virtually powerless to avoid unfavorable 
standardized terms.190  While recent empirical research demonstrates 
that some merchants grant their agents the authority to exercise 
discretion to forgive contract breaches and extend benefits beyond those 
provided in standardized terms,191 this type of merchant behavior is 
completely discretionary and leaves the consumer with no real power 
over the contract.192 
Moreover, a wealth of literature has established that firms target 
consumers’ cognitive vulnerabilities in their marketing and sales 
practices.193  Aware that consumers are unlikely to read contracts, some 
firms dispense with the “formality” of showing the contract to the 
consumer at all.194  Others manipulate the contracting environment to 
purposefully exploit consumers’ cognitive limitations.195  Worse, the 
 
187. Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 141, at 647–48. 
188. Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1547; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 
446–47; Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 141, at 648. 
189.  Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 
194 (2005). 
190. See Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1137 (“Given the prevalence of change-of-terms 
clauses, a consumer cannot reasonably avoid them.  In that sense then, there is an absence of 
meaningful choice.”). 
191. Johnston, supra note 182, at 864.  See Lucian A. Bebchuck & Richard A. Posner, One-
Sided Contracts in Competitive Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET 
CONTRACTS 3, 4 (2007) (arguing that one-sided boilerplate permits sellers “discretion with 
respect to how to treat the consumer”). 
192. Johnston, supra note 182, at 885.  Professor Johnston acknowledges that a firm that 
“rigidly enforces the harsh terms of its standard-form contracts . . . is just doing what it has a 
contractual right to do and is in a sense a much more straightforward actor than the firm that 
awards discretionary forgiveness and discretionary benefits.”  Id. at 886–87. 
193. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 715–22 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The 
Problem of Market Manipulation] (discussing an ALI Reporter’s study and other articles that 
ultimately support the authors’ conclusion that consumers are susceptible to manipulation by 
manufacturers because of consumers’ cognitive anomalies); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1420, 1425 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation] 
(providing evidence that manufacturers manipulate consumers’ perceptions and cognitive biases, 
which influences their decision making).  But see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffery J. 
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise 
Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 233 (2000) (arguing that proponents of enterprise 
liability have not produced evidence showing how advertisements or other sales methods 
effectively manipulate consumers). 
194. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 31. 
195. Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 193, at 673 
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perception that firms are self-regulating appears to further impede 
rational decision making.  Consumers have a tendency to trust the 
entities with which they contract to refrain from including boilerplate 
terms that would exploit consumers at the risk of their reputations.  This 
sense of trust further persuades consumers not to read and carefully 
consider the implications of contract provisions.196 
One could argue that despite the fact that these market forces tend to 
dictate the content of form provisions, consumers retain voluntariness in 
their ability to choose not to contract at all.  However, this argument is 
an empty one.  Form contracts permeate all aspects of consumers’ lives, 
as they have been adopted by nearly all industries and trades.197  Forms 
are used for transacting in all manners of goods and services, by cellular 
service providers, financial lenders, health clubs, mortgage companies, 
credit card issuers, rental companies, online music stores, and even 
healthcare service and insurance providers.198  “A person today who 
refused to contract unless he understood what he was committing 
himself to would deny himself most of the means of living in 
society.”199 
B. Incomplete Approaches to Incomplete Assent 
The standard form contract dilemma, while both controversial and 
multidimensional, is also a moving target.  As social scientists make 
new discoveries about the limitations on consumers’ abilities to access, 
understand, and make rational choices concerning standardized terms, 
the legal norms that govern standard contracts should evolve 
accordingly.200  However, legal theory has not kept pace with 
advancements in the understanding of consumer cognition and behavior.  
Many recent scholarly approaches to form contracts fail to fully explore 
and account for the full panoply of barriers to meaningful and voluntary 
choice faced by consumers.  Indeed, most conceive of the standard 
contract dilemma as no more than a problem of incomplete information.  
 
(discussing an experiment demonstrating how the status quo bias affects consumer individual 
preferences in contracting); Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note 
193, at 1429 (examining several instances in which manufacturers manipulated general consumer 
perceptions in the purchasing context).  
196. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 446–47 & nn.95–97. 
197. Barnes, supra note 2, at 229. 
198. Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of 
Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 384 (2008). 
199. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 21. 
200. See BEHAVIOR, LAW, AND ECONOMICS 2 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (“Analysis of law 
should be linked with what we have been learning about human behavior and choice.  After all, 
the legal system is pervasively in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and 
contexts for choice.”). 
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According to this view, consumers cannot meaningfully assent to 
standardized provisions in form contracts because they are not fully 
apprised of their content and meaning.  The remainder of this Section 
reviews the recent approaches to standardized contracts espousing this 
view and explains why they fall short of rectifying the profound 
deficiencies of assent and fairness implicit in form contracting. 
1. Mandatory Disclosure and Heightened Assent 
A number of scholars have argued that standardized terms in form 
contracts should be enforced only if they are explicitly brought to 
consumers’ attention.  These “disclosure” models are of two types.  One 
type suggests that courts should control the enforceability of form terms 
by requiring a showing that nonbargained-for terms in a form contract 
are both conspicuous and specifically assented to by the consumer.  
Thus, form terms are presumptively unenforceable absent specific 
evidence of objective assent to the particular terms.  Numerous 
scholarly proposals of this type have been advanced over the years.  
Professor Todd Rakoff famously asserted that nonbargained-for or 
“invisible” terms should be presumed unenforceable when challenged in 
litigation, unless the drafter could show their “visibility.”201  Professor 
Alex Seita later proposed that form contracts should be governed by 
default terms and overcome by standardized provisions only when the 
consumer gives “intelligent and meaningful” approval.202  Professor 
Michael Meyerson suggested that “consumers should only be bound by 
those contract terms that they know and comprehend.”203  More 
recently, Professor Edith Warkentine called for a “knowing assent” 
approach, whereby standardized terms that unfairly favor the drafter 
would be enforceable only upon a showing that the term was 
conspicuous and explained to the consumer, who in turn specifically 
and objectively assented to the inclusion of that term in the contract.204 
Another variation of the disclosure model proposes legislatively 
mandated disclosure of potentially onerous form terms.  Mandated 
disclosure requirements naturally tend to be industry-specific, aimed at 
providing consumers with access to information about products and 
contractual contingencies in an easy to understand form.205  One well-
known mandatory disclosure scheme, enacted under the Truth in 
 
201. Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1245, 1258. 
202. Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 132 (1984). 
203. Meyerson, Reunification, supra note 6, at 1299. 
204. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 473.   
205. See Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 755 (discussing the purposes of 
mandated disclosure requirements and when they are typically imposed). 
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Lending Act,206 requires disclosure of a number of contractual 
contingencies in certain financial transactions, including the 
circumstances under which fees may be imposed.207  Like judicially 
enforced disclosure models, some legislatively mandated disclosure 
models deny the enforceability of particular provisions unless drafters 
comply with certain disclosure requirements.208 
Proponents of disclosure argue that mandated disclosure provides 
consumers with information necessary to make better decisions.209  
Moreover, proponents predict that once consumers are educated about 
the terms of the contracts they sign, they will demand more favorable 
terms from the marketplace.210  Disclosure will motivate sellers to 
excise unfair terms from their contracts, lest they place their reputations 
in jeopardy or risk losing consumers to merchants with more favorable 
terms.211  Increased and targeted information thus will result in the self-
regulation of the marketplace.  Disclosure requirements are also 
attractive to lawmakers because they address efforts to make the 
substance of form contracts transparent rather than substantively 
regulating the terms of consumer contracts, which is often politically 
challenging.212  Mandated disclosure is therefore an alluring response to 
standard contracts because it is a solution that is likely to be adopted.213 
Disclosure models are laudable for their efforts to increase the flow 
of information to, and improve the decision making capabilities of, 
consumers.214  Many academics, however, question the wisdom of 
relying on these models to improve the quality and authenticity of 
consumer assent.215  Critics of mandated disclosure argue, and even 
some proponents admit, that consumers are not substantially more likely 
to read disclosures than the form terms themselves.216  Moreover, even 
 
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (West 2012). 
207. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 653–55. 
208. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1962) (requiring warranty disclaimers to be “conspicuous” as a 
prerequisite to enforceability). 
209. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 650. 
210. Burnham, supra note 124, at 223. 
211. Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 839, 845–46. 
212. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 681. 
213. Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 839. 
214. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 649. 
215. See, e.g., Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 849–50 (suggesting that 
mandatory website disclosure may not be effective as consumers do not act predictably and may 
even backfire); Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know about “Separability” in 
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 10–12 (2003) (urging that even 
conspicuous arbitration clauses may be ineffective in drawing consumers’ attention); White & 
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 234 (questioning the efficacy of disclosure forms for consumers 
generally and specifically whether consumers would understand such forms).  
216.  See, e.g., Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 757 (discussing some of 
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when consumers are provided with disclosures, the cognitive limitations 
that prevent consumers from making rational decisions about 
contractual contingencies continue to operate.217  As stated by 
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider in their recent 
comprehensive critique of mandated disclosure, disclosure is 
“fundamentally misconceived because its solution to the problem of 
choice is information alone,” and it ignores the evidence that “people’s 
problems choosing go well beyond ignorance.”218  Another 
commentator has remarked, “[t]o the extent that one does not 
understand the terms of the agreement, requiring the same to be printed 
in bold letters is like yelling at a deaf man.”219  Additionally, mandated 
disclosures may actually worsen consumers’ decision making 
capabilities.  Disclosures can provide excessive information, resulting in 
cognitive overload and increased confusion.220  And because 
disclosures are unlikely to improve the quality of decision making with 
respect to standardized terms, they are likewise unlikely to motivate 
businesses to self-regulate the content of those provisions. 
Ultimately, the notion that voluntary assent and personal autonomy 
are empowered by disclosure is misguided.  While additional 
information may, under some circumstances, be useful to consumers, on 
balance, attempts to disclose and explain standardized provisions do 
little to improve the quality of consumer assent to those terms or the 
content of those provisions. 
2. Expectations Doctrines 
Expectations-based approaches to standard contracts, according to 
which only those form provisions that conform to consumers’ 
expectations should be enforceable, are also popular with some 
academics today.221  Expectations doctrines are an outgrowth of Karl 
Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent” to standardized forms.222  
 
the deficiencies of information disclosure in light of consumer behavior); Hillman & Barakat, 
supra note 132, at 12–17 (arguing that consumers do not read standard electronic forms). 
217. Marrow, supra note 113, at 98–99; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological 
Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2003). 
218. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 720. 
219. Jacqueline R. Baum, Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Patient’s Perspective, 61 
WASH. U. L.Q. 123, 148 n.198 (1983). 
220. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 758. 
221. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing in favor of the increased use of 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211 to police standardized agreements); White & 
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 263 (arguing that unconscionability should converge with the 
reasonable expectations approach). 
222. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts 
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 33 (1984) [hereinafter Slawson, New Meaning] 
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Llewellyn famously posited that the notion that consumers assent to 
standardized terms is purely fictional and instead suggested that, beyond 
the “dickered” terms contained in the contract, consumers assent only to 
the “broad type of the transaction” and “any not unreasonable or 
indecent terms the seller may have had in his form, which do not alter or 
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”223  
Llewellyn’s theory thus stands out as a rejection of the strict application 
of the objective theory of contract formation and the duty to read as 
applied to consumer form contracts by holding “unreasonable” terms 
unenforceable despite external indications of assent.224  Expectations-
based approaches similarly provide exceptions to the duty to read in the 
consumer form context by limiting the effect of terms found to be 
“unexpected” by the parties. 
Scholars advocating expectations-based approaches call for an 
expansion of one of two devices currently employed by courts: the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations and section 211 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.  Section 211 was developed specifically for the 
treatment of standardized agreements and embraces the traditional duty 
to read by declaring that a party who signs a standardized agreement is 
bound by its terms.225  The provision, however, goes on to create an 
exception to this general approach, under which a term may be excised 
from the agreement when “the other party has reason to believe that the 
party manifesting such assent would not do so” had he known of the 
provision.226  The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a judicial 
doctrine related to, but distinct from, section 211.  This doctrine holds 
that the objectively reasonable expectations of consumers regarding 
contract terms will be honored even though a painstaking study of the 
 
(discussing Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent”). 
223. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 370.  Llewellyn contrasts “dickered” 
terms—material terms that are negotiated by the parties—with “boilerplate.”  Id. at 370–71.  
224. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 489–90. 
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).  Section 211, titled 
“Standardized Agreements,” provides: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise 
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly 
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an 
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.   
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those terms 
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard 
terms of the writing.   
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent 
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not 
part of the agreement. 
Id. 
226. Id. § 211(3).  
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provisions would have negated those expectations.227  While section 
211 requires courts to consider whether the terms conflict with the 
drafter’s reasonable expectations of the consumer’s behavior, the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations permits courts to eliminate terms 
that conflict with the consumer’s reasonable expectations.228  The 
difference between the results reached under either approach turns on 
which point of view the court adopts.  Both doctrines, however, are 
cognizant that consumers are often not apprised of the content in 
standardized provisions and seek to remedy this deficiency in assent. 
Expectations approaches share a number of attributes that should 
point to their success.  First, it is axiomatic that “[c]ontract doctrine is 
designed to protect the expectations of the parties.”229  Thus, 
expectations doctrines comport with the fundamentals of classical 
contract theory.  Second, expectations approaches discourage merchants 
from creating unreasonable or inaccurate expectations through the use 
of marketing or promotional materials.230  Moreover, expectations 
approaches implicitly recognize that consumers will not read or 
understand form contracts, and thus these contracts are fertile ground 
for overreaching and oppression.231  Therefore, these approaches appear 
capable of satisfying concerns of both traditionalists and consumer 
advocates. 
In practice, however, expectations doctrines have not thrived.  Both 
section 211 and the reasonable expectations doctrine have been limited 
primarily to the policing of insurance contracts.232  Additionally, when 
measured against the realities of consumer behavior in the marketplace, 
expectations approaches admit a number of structural flaws.  
Expectations approaches are premised on the assumptions that 
consumers develop specific expectations about the standardized terms 
 
227. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 961, 967 (1970); see id. at 966–67 (arguing that increase-of-risk language in insurance 
policies could be interpreted to honor consumers’ reasonable expectations). 
228. But see Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 83–84 (noting that many courts in the 
application of section 211 have focused on the consumers’, rather than the drafters’, 
expectations). 
229. Hartzog, supra note 175, at 408.  See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
1.1, at 2 (1963) [hereinafter  1 PERILLO, CORBIN] (“The law of contracts attempts the realization 
of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise.”). 
230. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(4), at 634–35 (student 
ed. 1988). 
231. Barnes, supra note 2, at 250–51; Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 748–49; 
Warkentine, supra note 5, at 498, 508; James J. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2, 
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 324–25 (1997); White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 262–64.   
232. White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 262–63. 
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of the contracts that they sign and that these expectations are based on 
rational evaluations of available information.233  However, newly 
emerging psychological evidence of consumers’ cognitive limitations 
demonstrates that both of these assumptions are flawed.234  Consumers 
generally do not undertake a comprehensive evaluation of standardized 
terms nor do they form expectations about those provisions.235 
Additionally, both expectations approaches admit the enforceability 
of provisions of which the consumer is made aware.236  Thus, 
provisions that are made conspicuous to the consumer or otherwise 
disclosed by the merchant are automatically included within the 
expectations of consumers.  Worse, provisions that consumers may have 
failed to understand or incorporate into the decision making process due 
to cognitive limitations will also fall within consumers’ expectations.  
Expectations approaches are further weakened by market-based 
limitations to consumer assent.  These approaches tie the enforceability 
of standardized terms to their familiarity.  Presumably, if onerous form 
terms are highly present in the marketplace and generally recognized by 
the public, they will come to form the consumer’s “reasonable 
expectations” regardless of how one-sided those terms may be or 
whether the consumer had any real opportunity to shop for better terms 
elsewhere in the market. 
Section 211 is particularly flawed because, unlike the reasonable 
expectations doctrine, it requires the consumer to show, as a 
prerequisite to striking an unexpected form term, that he would not have 
consented to the contract at all had he known of the term in advance.237  
Thus, section 211 rests on an assumption that, once apprised of an 
unfavorable standardized term, the consumer would decline to enter the 
contract.  This assumption ignores the cognitive factors that limit 
consumer decision making, particularly the fact that consumers do not 
base their decisions about whether to contract on the standardized 
provisions that section 211 seeks to regulate.238  It also fails to account 
for the fact that, because form terms are often uniform across the 
marketplace, consumers lack any real choice among alternatives. 
 
233. Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 300 (1998).   
234. Id. at 304–05. 
235. Id. at 305. 
236. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 749–50; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 
230, § 6.3(c) at 641–42. 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). 
238. See Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 222, at 62–63 (explaining that consumers do not 
make purchasing decisions based on particular terms, but rather a rough, subjective evaluation of 
all the terms).  
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In sum, while expectations approaches provide much needed 
exceptions to the traditional duty to read in the context of consumer 
form contracts, they do not fully account for the full gamut of internal 
and external forces that impede consumer assent, nor do they 
necessarily operate to eliminate excessively onerous terms from the 
marketplace.  While calls for the expansion of these approaches are 
praiseworthy for their efforts to bring contract doctrine in line with the 
realities of form contracting, they fail to do so in a comprehensive 
manner. 
C. The Sliding Scale’s Meaningful Assent Inquiry 
Early supporters of the unconscionability doctrine held high hopes 
for its potential to reshape traditional notions of freedom of contract in 
the realm of standardized agreements by authorizing courts to police 
contracts lacking in meaningful assent.239  However, courts have 
struggled to identify those contracts in which consent is sufficiently 
lacking to justify judicial intervention in the first place.  The evolution 
of the sliding scale approach represents a continued effort to identify 
with more precision those agreements deserving the attention of the 
court. 
Under the two-part analytical framework, the procedural prong serves 
to identify those contracts lacking meaningful assent.240  Additionally, 
the conventional approach to finding procedural unconscionability 
requires specific indicia of surprise or oppression in the contracting 
process.  Because strong evidence of procedural deficiency has 
historically been required to justify judicial intervention, courts 
employing a conventional approach are unlikely to find the procedural 
prong satisfied in the absence of multiple factors traditionally associated 
with lack of choice, such as the use of fine print, a high pressure 
environment, and the fact that the complaining party was too old, 
impoverished, or unsophisticated to understand the significance of the 
terms. 241 
However, interdisciplinary research studying consumer cognition and 
market forces demonstrate that the traditional objective indicia of assent 
seized upon by most courts are not useful indicators of meaningful 
 
239. See, e.g., John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. 
REV. 931, 935–36 (1969) (explaining that the unconscionability doctrine permits “freedom of 
contract” to encompass the ability of parties to “co-determine the terms of a contract”). 
240. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 706, 709. 
241. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1111–12 (discussing “predictive power” of external 
markers of consent in unconscionability decisions). 
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choice with respect to standard form contracts.242  Social psychologists 
and behavioral economists have established that consent is undercut far 
more dramatically by practical and cognitive limitations on consumers’ 
abilities to evaluate the risks associated with standardized terms and the 
very futility of such an evaluation than by incomplete information.  
Therefore, the conventional approach to procedural unconscionability is 
a weak indicator of meaningful assent.  Moreover, the conventional 
approach is not merely unhelpful, but also harmful in its adherence to 
faulty and obsolete assumptions about consumer decision making.  As a 
result, the conventional approach to procedural unconscionability 
suffers from the same shortcomings of recent scholarly solutions to 
standard form contracts, namely mandated disclosure, heightened 
assent, and reasonable expectations doctrines. 
The sliding scale approach, on the other hand, allows decision makers 
to incorporate the emerging understanding of consumer behavior into 
the unconscionability framework.  First, the sliding scale’s reduced 
threshold for procedural unconscionability deemphasizes the 
importance of unhelpful external markers of assent.  Indications that 
language in the contract was bolded or that the consumer was given an 
opportunity to review contract terms can be ignored when the facts 
clearly demonstrate that the consumer lacked the power to negotiate 
contract terms in the first place.  Second, the use of the sliding scale by 
some courts to find procedural unconscionability through the existence 
of a contract of adhesion, without a detailed analysis of the 
particularized contracting environment, focuses courts’ attention on 
consumers’ bargaining power, which is by far the most significant 
factor affecting meaningful assent to standardized terms. 
III. ADDRESSING FORMALIST CONCERNS 
Although the unconscionability doctrine was specifically designed to 
provide courts with a means of correcting deficiencies in consent and 
fairness that plague standard form contracts, until very recently its use 
has been restricted both in scope and frequency.  Courts’ reluctance to 
employ the doctrine to control form contracts is tied directly to the 
dominance of formalist thinking about contract enforcement and 
judicial intervention in private agreements.  While the persistence of 
contract formalism once threatened to destroy unconscionability’s 
viability as a policing device, a recent surge in unconscionability 
jurisprudence evidences increasing judicial resistance to formalist 
thought.  The sliding scale approach further pushes against formalist 
 
242. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the psychological barriers to knowing assent). 
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thinking, but sufficiently balances formalist concerns such that it does 
not run too far afoul of traditional contract doctrine. 
A. Formalist Restraints on Judicial Interventionism 
Unconscionability was mainstreamed into contract law with a single 
and express purpose—to permit courts to police contracts on fairness 
grounds.243  Prior to the doctrine’s adoption, some courts took the 
liberty of setting aside contracts that they determined to be so unfair as 
to “shock the conscience.”244  However, the vast majority of courts 
were uncomfortable with such unconcealed judicial subjectivity and, as 
a result, found indirect ways to deny enforcement of terms tinged with 
overreaching, oppression, and unfair surprise.245  These courts either 
stretched existing doctrines of fraud, duress, and failure of consideration 
beyond their boundaries or engaged in aggressively strict interpretation 
of contractual provisions to prevent unfair results.246  Out of regard for 
“freedom of contract,” these courts did not explicitly invalidate 
contracts on the basis of fairness, but rather concealed such 
determinations behind accepted consent doctrines and devices of 
construction.247 
Concerned with the “covert tools” employed by courts,248 the drafters 
of the UCC crafted a doctrine of unconscionability that would invite 
jurists to employ a more intellectually honest approach to judicial 
oversight.249  The codification of unconscionability also served an 
 
243. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177, § 29.2; RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:1; Harry 
G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 459, 468–69 (1995); LORD, supra note 27, § 18:9.  
244. See, e.g., Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. 42, 60 (1853) (proposing that courts “ought to interfere” 
when there is unconscionability).  The equitable power of the Court to set aside an 
“unconscionable” contract was recognized as early as 1816.  See Hepburn v. Dunlop & Co., 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 179, 197 (1816) (“But if the contract ought not, in conscience, to bind one of the 
parties, . . . a court of equity will interpose and afford a relief, which a court of common law 
cannot, by setting aside the contract . . . .”).   
245. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40; CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177, 
§ 29.2, at 381; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(A)(2). 
246. Dando B. Cellini & Barry L. Wertz, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of 
Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. REV. 193, 203–04 (1967); CORBIN, 
supra note 177, § 29.2, at 380–81; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(A)(2). 
247. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177, § 29.2; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 
27, § 96(A)(2). 
248. Karl N. Llewellyn, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702−03 (1939) (reviewing O. PRAUSNITZ, 
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 
(1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Book Review] ([W]e have developed a whole series of semi-covert 
techniques for somewhat balancing these bargains. . . .  Covert tools are never reliable tools.”). 
249. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952) provides: 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against 
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable.  In the past such policing 
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expressive function, alerting the judiciary of the need for judicial 
intervention in contracts infected by bad faith bargaining and 
overreaching.250  In his testimony before the New York Law Revision 
Commission, Llewellyn lamented that by indirectly policing unfair 
bargains, courts failed to set minimum standards of decency for the 
commercial community and to alert drafters when those standards had 
been violated.251  Codifying unconscionability, he predicted, would 
correct that problem.252 
Early on, the judiciary embraced the flexibility and promise of 
unconscionability by expanding it beyond the borders of the UCC and 
integrating it into the broader realm of contract doctrine.253  The 
American Law Institute soon adopted an unconscionability provision in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts nearly identical to the one found 
in the UCC.254  Both sources of the doctrine are broadly formulated, 
drawing no distinctions between merchants and consumers or preprinted 
and negotiated contracts.255  As a result, courts have applied the 
doctrine to all types of contracts, both as a stand-alone doctrine and in 
conjunction with other policing devices.256 
Soon after the adoption of the UCC, courts successfully deployed 
unconscionability in a number of landmark decisions to protect 
consumers from overreaching by form drafters.257  The initial 
 
has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the 
rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public 
policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract.  This section is intended to allow the 
court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause 
therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. 
Additionally, the legislative history of the UCC’s unconscionability provision makes clear that 
the doctrine was imported into the UCC for the purpose of giving judges a sanctioned doctrine 
with which to declare contractual terms invalid on fairness grounds.  RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-
302:1. 
250. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1072; Knapp, supra note 16, at 609. 
251. I LAW REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 1954 AND 
RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 176–78 (1954).  
252. Id.  
253. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7, at 703–04; SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, 
at 135, 140–42.  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was the first decision to explicitly 
declare unconscionability to be part of the common law of contract.  350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965).  Some courts refuse to apply the UCC’s formulation of unconscionability outside the 
realm of sales of goods, acknowledging that the common law doctrine would be applicable to 
services contracts.  See, e.g., Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E.2d 749, 752 (W. 
Va. 1986). 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).  
255. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1077−78 (pointing out courts’ apparent failure to 
“define merchant in relationship to the unconscionability doctrine”).  
256. Id. at 1078–79. 
257. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 612–13 (discussing the impact of the landmark 
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momentum of the unconscionability doctrine, however, was short lived.  
Following widespread adoption of Leff’s two-part framework, 
unconscionability claims became increasingly less successful.  
Beginning in the 1970s, case law applying the unconscionability 
doctrine was rather scarce, leading some commentators to declare its 
demise.258  Unconscionability claims were likewise rarely litigated, and 
even more rarely successful, during the 1980s and early 1990s.259  As 
stated by one commentator, “[t]he conventional wisdom is that most 
unconscionability claims fail.”260 
The forces that have operated against the success of the 
unconscionability doctrine are many and varied.261  By far the most 
significant of these forces is the persistence of formalism in contract 
theory—a rule-based approach to contract that is concerned primarily 
with enforcing bargains clothed in objective indicia of consent.262  
Formalist thinking about contract formation and enforcement was a 
natural outgrowth of the burst of commercial growth and accompanying 
laissez-faire approach to economics that dominated commerce during 
the nineteenth century.263  In short, contract law developed so as to 
encourage individuals to freely enter bargains without fear of 
government intervention.264 
Formalist thinking in contract doctrine has since persisted and has, in 
fact, experienced a surge in popularity in recent years due to its many 
 
unconscionability case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.); Martin B. Shulkin, 
Unconscionability—The Code, the Court, and the Consumer, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 367, 
377–78 (1968) (reviewing early cases decided under UCC section 2-302).   
258. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 287–89 (noting the uncertainty surrounding courts’ 
applications of the unconscionability doctrine).  
259. See Prince, supra note 243, at 463–64, 463 n.15 (noting that during the 1990s, the study 
group appointed to consider revising Article 2 of the UCC found that section 2-302 had not 
proven to be the “unruly and fearsome creature that critics first anticipated”).  See generally 
James W. Johnson, Unconscionability and the Federal Chancellors: A Survey of U.C.C. Section 
2-302 Interpretations in the Federal Circuits During the 1980’s, 16 LINCOLN L. REV. 21 (1985) 
(finding that only one of the reported federal cases during the 1980s involving UCC section 2-302 
clearly accepted the unconscionability claim). 
260. Randall, supra note 16, at 194. 
261. See Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 813 (discussing various interrelated factors 
that contributed to the decline of the unconscionability doctrine); Knapp, supra note 16, at 613 
(attributing the decline to the shift in consumer protection law from a litigation-based approach to 
a legislative- and regulatory-based approach).  
262. Morant, supra note 129, at 928.  See Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party 
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 498 (2010) (defining formalism as 
“a theory of contract law that, above all else, elevates the content of the parties’ written contract 
(its form) over any concerns for normative values or societal notions of fairness”).   
263. Morant, supra note 129, at 930. 
264. Id.  For a general discussion of classical contract theory and the role of government, see 
SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 9–12.   
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benefits.265  Adherence to the objective theory of contract formation 
fosters legal certainty and as a result, market stability.266  Reliance on 
formalist rules also provides for simplicity, both in bargain formation 
and the adjudication of disputes.267  Those who champion formalism 
also argue that strict enforcement of contract rules promotes efficiency 
and optimal distribution of economic resources.268 
However, since the nineteenth century, social and economic 
conditions have changed dramatically.  The vast majority of contracts 
today are made between producers and consumers of products, with 
consumers entirely dependent upon producers for nearly everything that 
they eat, wear, and use.269  Merchants almost always enjoy superior 
bargaining power and exercise that power by controlling all terms in the 
agreement.270  The diversity and proliferation of products available on 
the market and the sheer number of contracts made prevent the 
consumer from gaining a deep understanding of either the product or the 
contract made to secure it.271  As a result, contracts are often very 
unfavorable to consumers. 
Classical contract doctrine generally makes little concession for the 
bargaining power inequalities that plague consumers.  The freedom of 
contract principle prohibits a court from interfering with a contract that 
may be perceived as unfair.272  The objective theory of contract 
formation and the accompanying duty to read prevent courts from 
looking beyond objective manifestations of assent to determine if the 
consumers understand contract terms.273  And, although formalist 
decision making may not always accurately reflect the realities of 
contracting behavior, clear rules provide certainty without which the 
economy could not function effectively.  Reversal of the duty to read, 
for example, would result in invalidation of all contracts an 
overwhelming majority of consumer contracts.  The unconscionability 
doctrine, therefore, was designed to address the inadequacies of 
 
265. Morant, supra note 129, at 942.  
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 73.  
269. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 22. 
270. Id. at 25. 
271. Id. at 26.  
272. Id. at 35.  As explained by Professor Slawson, the freedom of contract principle prohibits 
courts from either invalidating unfair contract provisions or supplanting unfair contract terms 
with court-created substitutes: “The first option would violate the parties’ ‘freedom to’ include 
anything in their contracts they chose.  The second would violate their ‘freedom from’ laws that 
would limit this freedom.”  Id.  
273. Id. at 36. 
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classical contract theory by permitting limited exceptions to formalist 
enforcement of bargains.274 
Unsurprisingly, the unconscionability doctrine has met considerable 
criticism on formalist grounds.275  The primary complaint concerns the 
doctrine’s vagueness.276  The lack of a precise definition provides 
judges with wide latitude in its application and, as a result, judicial 
determinations regarding unconscionability are perceived as overly 
subjective.277  Because the doctrine lacks clear statutory guidelines, 
judicial findings of unconscionability are largely fact-based and difficult 
to generalize.278  Unconscionability is therefore condemned for creating 
uncertainty regarding which agreements will be enforced and which will 
be struck down.  Furthermore, critics of unconscionability complain that 
judicial intrusion into private dealings threatens contractual liberty and 
conflicts with the freedom of will that is central to contract doctrine.279  
These critics fear that judges will impose their personal values at the 
expense of the individual will of the parties.280  Such judicial oversight 
is viewed as paternalism at its worst, shaking the very foundation of 
contract law and market efficiency.281  Broad social and political 
backlash against “judicial activism” in matters outside of the contract 
law realm have further compounded unconscionability’s disrepute.282 
The academic response to the tension between unconscionability and 
classical contract theory has consisted primarily of a rejection of the 
doctrine in favor of approaches to standardized contracts that arguably 
fit more squarely with the resurgence in formalist thought.283  Even 
 
274. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 74.  
275. Id. at 94–102.  
276. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 31, at 559 (criticizing section 2-302 for “say[ing] nothing with 
words”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3, at 155 (“Experimentation with even a single 
case shows this [litmus] test to be . . . useless; in no sense is the Comment an objective definition 
of the word.  It is simply a [hopelessly subjective] synonym[] laden covered with a heavy value 
burden: ‘oppression,’ ‘unfair,’ or ‘one-sided.’”); Spanogle, Jr., supra note 239, at 942 (“The terms 
‘unfair surprise’ and ‘oppression’ are no more concretely definable than the term 
‘unconscionable’ so the Comment seems to offer slogan words rather than an explanation of the 
purposes behind the statute.”); cf. Randall, supra note 16, at 188 (“[T]he malleability of the 
doctrine . . . is acknowledged as one of its chief virtues.”); Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 
73–74 (describing unconscionability as “a flexible safety net”).  
277. Morant, supra note 129, at 942. 
278. See Warkentine, supra note 5, at 484 (“[A]lthough there are now many cases that address 
unconscionability, they have little value as precedents.”). 
279. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 94. 
280. Id. at 96.  
281. Id. at 95–96.  
282. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 763–64; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet 
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading 
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 189–204 (1998). 
283. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 264 (“[T]he common law of contracts can and should 
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scholars concerned with contract fairness and consumer protection 
advocate legislative or administrative solutions to unconscionable terms 
in standard contracts due to concerns about judicial interventionism in 
contract disputes.284  Repeated condemnation of unconscionability, 
together with the association between unconscionability and 
unrestrained judicial activism, discourage judges from thoughtfully 
considering unconscionability claims.285  Furthermore, as a result of 
judicial distaste for the doctrine, consumers have become reluctant to 
plead it.286  As the number of claims dwindles, so too does the 
remaining judicial appetite for the doctrine.  Indeed, formalist scholars 
praise the relative disuse of unconscionability as a triumph.287 
B. The Revival of Unconscionability 
For decades, the story of unconscionability has been one of survival 
rather than of growth.  Despite persistent formalist criticism, the last 
decade has been a period of reinvigoration for the doctrine.  The number 
of reported decisions in which unconscionability has been raised has 
increased dramatically.288  Perhaps more importantly, the success rate 
of unconscionability claims has steadily risen as well.  A number of 
empirical studies demonstrate the revival of the unconscionability 
doctrine in sharp detail.  One study of reported decisions addressing 
claims of unconscionability in 2002 and 2003 found 42.5% of those 
claims proved successful for plaintiffs.289  While this figure indicates 
that unconscionability claims remain difficult to win, a comparison 
across time indicates that unconscionability claims are becoming more 
successful.290  Another study that analyzed decisions between 1990 and 
 
change in response to the changing needs of the day . . . .”); Prince, supra note 243, at 462 (noting 
that some fear giving too much power to courts to strike items will lead to inconsistent and 
unpredictable interference in contracts); Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 780 n.82, 840–
41 (noting a trend toward formalism that extends beyond just the Supreme Court and that “the 
prevailing norm posits that the judicial role in policing contracts should be circumscribed”).  
284. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 821.  
285. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 92. 
286. Morant, supra note 129, at 947. 
287. See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 92–99. 
288. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 621–22 (noting that the “tide was beginning to turn” as 
early as the mid-1990s).  
289. Randall, supra note 16, at 194. 
290. Id. at 196.  For instance, Professor Randall found that only 16.7% of unconscionability 
claims were successful between 1982 and 1983.  Id.  Other empirical studies have reached similar 
findings.  See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 16, at 619–26 (reporting a “substantial” increase in 
unconscionability cases between 1990 and 2008); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The 
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1436–41 (2008) (reporting an increase in unconscionability challenges in 
cases involving arbitration from 1% to 15–20% over time).  Not all empirical studies support the 
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2008 reported a “very definite increase” in the number of cases 
involving unconscionability claims and an overall increase in the 
success of those claims.291 
The bulk of the reported decisions raising unconscionability, and the 
lion’s share of those in which the claim is successful, address the 
unconscionability of arbitration clauses.292  However, unconscionability 
jurisprudence is not limited to arbitration clauses alone.  A significant 
number of decisions address a range of additional risk-shifting 
provisions in standard form contracts.293  In particular, 
unconscionability claims attacking liquidated damages clauses, 
limitation of liability or remedy clauses, and warranty disclaimer 
clauses also enjoy a relatively high degree of success.294 
The increased popularity and success of the unconscionability 
doctrine reflect a greater willingness among judges to exercise their 
mandate to police unfair contracts.  Moreover, the high success rates for 
claims involving arbitration, remedy limitation, warranty disclaimers, 
and liquidated damages clauses signal that judges are particularly 
concerned with the substantive aspect of unconscionability.295  While 
some scholars initially speculated that the resurgence in 
unconscionability was “activist” in nature, citing its restriction to 
particular geographical areas,296 recent empirical evidence indicates that 
 
conclusion that the number of successful unconscionability claims is rising.  For example, 
Professors Larry A. DiMatteo and Bruce Louis Rich compared decisions reported between 1968 
and 1980 with those reported between 1991 and 2003 and concluded that, although there was a 
slight increase (7%) in the number of successful cases between the two time periods, the increase 
was not significant.  DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1100–01.  It is possible that this reported 
increase was less dramatic than that seen in other studies because it included decisions rendered 
in the late 1960s, before judicial interest in the doctrine experienced its first decline. 
291. Knapp, supra note 16, at 621.  
292. See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 44–48 (2006) (finding that unconscionability challenges succeed more 
frequently in California appellate courts when they involve arbitration clauses); Knapp, supra 
note 16, at 622 (“Of the total number of unconscionability decisions gathered in our study, those 
involving arbitration clauses accounted for the lion’s share of the overall increase.”); Randall, 
supra note 16, at 194 (finding, in a study of unconscionability decisions reported between 2002 
and 2003, that courts found nearly twice as many arbitration agreements unconscionable as other 
types of clauses). 
293. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1113. 
294. See id. (citing a 60% success rate for claims against liquidated damages clauses, a 51% 
success rate for claims against limitation of liability or remedy clauses, and a 41% success rate for 
claims against disclaimer or warranty clauses; compared to a 75% success rate for claims against 
arbitration clauses, and a 37.8% success rate for all other claims).  
295. See id. (noting that these types of claims are highly “policed due to their inherent 
substantive naughtiness”). 
296. Broome, supra note 292, at 39–40; Prince, supra note 243, at 465; Amy J. Schmitz, 
Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. 
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both federal and state courts across the nation are increasingly 
responding to unfair terms in standard form contracts.297  Thus, on the 
one hand, the empirical evidence suggests a broad and building trend 
toward judicial rejection of the formalist opposition to 
unconscionability.  On the other hand, because the upward trend of 
unconscionability is still relatively “mild,” with less than fifty percent of 
unconscionability claims successful, there appears to be little risk of the 
widespread judicial interference in contract that is so feared by the 
doctrine’s critics.298 
C. The Sliding Scale’s Balance of Fairness and Formalism 
The sliding scale approach may further assist in insulating the 
doctrine from formalist attacks that undermine judicial oversight of 
standardized terms.  Although proponents of unconscionability have 
long praised the doctrine for its ability to “protect core human values” 
through judicial creativity,299 few have directly addressed the chief 
formalist critiques.300  However, contract doctrine is unlikely to shed 
the dominance of formalism.301  Therefore, the continued vitality of 
unconscionability and its utility as a tool for preventing abuses of 
bargaining power depends upon its ability to accommodate formalist 
concerns. 
The conventional approach to unconscionability is decidedly 
formalist.  Requiring strong evidence of procedural unconscionability 
maintains the ideal of freedom of contract by permitting judges to 
interfere only in contracts that exhibit clear deficiencies in consent.302  
High thresholds for substantive unconscionability prevent judges from 
intervening in all but the most egregious of cases, ensuring that judges 
will not use the doctrine inappropriately to impose their own subjective 
views of fairness onto consumer contracts in the absence of clear 
evidence of oppression or overreaching.303  Thus, the conventional 
approach to the doctrine carefully restricts judicial intervention to a 
narrow subset of cases involving extreme unfairness and overreaching. 
 
REV. 123, 142 (2007). 
297. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1096; Knapp, supra note 16, at 623–35; Randall, 
supra note 16, at 194–95.  
298. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 809–10.  
299. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 73.  
300. See, e.g., Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 792–93 (stating that the doctrine is 
“perfectly consistent with the governing norms of contract and policy reasons underlying freedom 
of contract: consent, bargain, free will, free exchange, and wealth maximization”).  
301. Morant, supra note 129, at 929. 
302. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7. 
303. Id. 
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The sliding scale approach, on the other hand, represents resistance 
against the formalist trend by the judiciary.  The sliding scale’s 
relaxation of the procedural inquiry permits judges more freedom to 
substantively scrutinize the content of consumer contracts.  
Furthermore, the sliding scale’s relaxed approach to substantive 
unconscionability demonstrates that courts are increasingly comfortable 
passing on the question of what is “unreasonable” or “unfair” in the 
marketplace, though perhaps short of “outrageous.” 
However, the sliding scale approach does not necessarily work 
against formalist norms.  For example, formalists are concerned with 
individual freedom and fear that a liberal application of the 
unconscionability doctrine will permit judges to supplant free choice 
with personal notions of fairness.304  Such thinking rests in part on an 
assumption that consumers make rational choices that will lead to the 
inclusion of efficient terms in negotiated contracts.305  It therefore fails 
to take cognizance that the vast majority of consumer contracts are not 
freely negotiated and that consumers’ choices regarding the risks 
inherent in those contracts are far from rational.  Formalist thinking 
about contract law is based also in concerns about economic efficiency 
and optimal distribution of resources.  However, such thinking is 
premised on the discredited hypothesis that market forces will regulate 
contract terms when consumers do not.  A more robust use of 
unconscionability to police consumer contracts in fact promotes 
contractual freedom and economic efficiency by counterbalancing the 
effects of consumers’ disadvantaged bargaining position.306 
The principal complaint regarding unconscionability concerns the 
doctrine’s vagueness—formalists fear that fact-dependent, result-
oriented unconscionability decisions will unpredictably upset 
contractual expectations.307  However, use of the sliding scale approach 
should actually increase predictability in unconscionability 
jurisprudence.  Much of the uncertainty in the unconscionability 
analysis concerns the procedural prong, as courts struggle to identify 
specific factors indicating a lack of meaningful choice and disagree as 
to what factors are the most appropriate indicators.  To the extent that 
the sliding scale approach deemphasizes these factors and instead 
emphasizes the substance of contractual provisions, a more coherent 
and predictable body of jurisprudence will evolve, particularly if courts 
endorsing the sliding scale approach coalesce in finding the procedural 
 
304. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 94–96.  
305. Id. at 97. 
306. Id. at 76.  
307. Id. at 94, 97–98.  
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unconscionability prong satisfied by the existence of a contract of 
adhesion. 
Importantly, many judges employing a sliding scale approach 
continue to exercise their power to invalidate offending contractual 
terms in moderation.  This self-limitation stems from judges’ underlying 
belief in the importance of standardized contracts to the stability of the 
marketplace and commercial operations.308  At the same time, judges 
who employ the sliding scale approach recognize that a measured 
application of the unconscionability norm is both appropriate and 
necessary for the proper functioning of the economy.  One court, 
addressing the tension between formalist concerns and contractual 
fairness, explained: 
Regardless, however, of the unease which its potential use produces, 
the doctrine of unconscionability has a place in our jurisprudence so 
that grossly unfair or one-sided contracts may be properly “policed.” 
. . .  In appropriate cases, the doctrine of unconscionability provides a 
more than proper and valid basis for interdicting an inequitable result 
which would otherwise flow from the cold enforcement of the terms 
of a contract. 
 . . . . 
. . . While the risk of defining the doctrine through such a case-by-case 
approach is the possible loss of restraint and consistency, the 
advantage is a device inherently governed by the particular 
circumstances of each case measured against the experiences of past 
and present judges, the lifeblood of the common law.309 
The sliding scale approach, with its continued emphasis on defective 
assent as a prerequisite to judicial intervention, permits judges to engage 
in the policing of agreements only when the contracting process did not 
effectively safeguard the individual will of the parties. 
IV. CALIBRATING THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH 
Although the sliding scale’s relaxed approach to unconscionability 
shows promise, it requires some fine-tuning to achieve its full potential.  
Specific calibrations for the sliding scale approach are needed so as to 
facilitate a careful and controlled expansion of the unconscionability 
doctrine.  The following recommendations seek to bring the 
unconscionability analysis into closer parallel with the realities of 
consumer contracting while preventing it from attracting formalist 
aggression that will impede its continued growth.  These calibrations are 
not intended to constrain the malleability of the unconscionability 
 
308. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 472.   
309. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 918–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002). 
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doctrine.  Unconscionability’s flexibility remains one of its chief 
virtues.  However, some tempering is required to achieve greater 
uniformity between the various state approaches and to ensure that the 
doctrine continues to evolve toward greater protection of consumer 
interests. 
A. A Dual-Prong Approach 
Despite academic310 and judicial311 criticism of unconscionability’s 
two-prong analytical framework, a dual-prong approach is critical to its 
continued success.  The concepts of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability are analytically distinct—each serves a unique 
purpose.312  Courts should therefore continue to require both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability before refusing to enforce an 
offending provision. 
Procedural unconscionability—which looks for defects in the 
bargaining process—is essential for establishing deficiencies in assent 
that justify judicial intervention in contractual dealings.313  A sliding 
scale approach that continues to require some evidence of process 
failure accommodates formalist concerns by preventing judicial 
overreaching into freely negotiated contracts; a single-prong approach 
that permits a finding of unconscionability on the basis of substantive 
unconscionability alone goes too far by allowing courts to impose 
personal or societal notions of fairness at the expense of personal 
liberty.314  Furthermore, a substantive unconscionability analysis devoid 
of procedural inquiry doubles as a “public policy” inquiry in disguise, to 
the detriment of the clarity of both devices for invalidating contracts. 
Additionally, to the extent that courts view extreme evidence of 
substantive unconscionability as implying some procedural 
deficiency,315 courts should take care to make this inference explicit.  
 
310. See, e.g., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(B)(2)(c) (proposing alternatives 
to the “procedural/substantive dichotomy”); Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 109 (“[T]he 
rigid two-prong test does not adequately address the needs of the textured and ever-changing 
contracting market.”); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 
31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 374 (1969) (“The proposal here made is that the element of assent be 
excised from the determination of unconscionability in consumer transactions.”). 
311. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (noting that the 
two-prong unconscionability framework is “based more on the historical reluctance of courts to 
disturb contracts than on valid doctrinal underpinning”). 
312. See supra Parts I.B.I and I.B.2 (explaining the procedural and substantive prongs).  
313. See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining procedural unconscionability and the factors courts take 
into consideration to determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable).  
314. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining that some courts have premised the finding of 
unconscionability on substantive unconscionability alone). 
315. See supra Part I.C.3 (explaining that the single-prong approach may be viewed as an 
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The act of directly acknowledging procedural deficiencies permits 
courts the opportunity to explore the deep problems with consent 
associated with form contracts and, in particular, to explicitly 
acknowledge that extremely one-sided contract terms are usually the 
result of a lack of meaningful choice resulting from inequalities in 
bargaining power.  The assent inquiry afforded by a procedural 
unconscionability analysis therefore serves both an expressive and an 
evaluative function. 
Moreover, evidence of substantive unconscionability, in the form of 
unfairness or unreasonable risk allocation, ensures that economic 
stability is not undermined by the needless invalidation of standard form 
contracts on the basis of lack of meaningful assent alone.  As experts’ 
understanding of the limits of consumer cognition and decision making 
deepens, the argument that consumers are capable of meaningfully 
assenting to standard form contracts becomes difficult to defend.316  
Invalidation of contracts on the basis of lack of assent without evidence 
of a substantive flaw in the contract would therefore result in the 
disruption of the majority of contracts made by consumers in their 
everyday dealings.  Evidence of intolerable substantive unfairness is 
needed to identify those contracts in which judicial interference is 
justified. 
Finally, the disruption of standard form contracts on the basis of lack 
of assent alone does not serve any fruitful purpose.  If the deficiencies 
in consent could be remedied by providing consumers with streamlined 
forms, additional information disclosures, and time to consider the 
transaction, then invalidating contracts on the basis of procedural 
unconscionability alone would encourage merchants to engage in 
behaviors that would improve the overall contracting process.  But the 
evidence suggests that while the complexity of forms and pressures of 
the contracting environment may exacerbate failures in consumer 
decision making, more time and information do not cure them.  Thus, 
invalidation of form contracts on the basis of procedural deficiencies 
alone promotes inefficiency by encouraging merchants to alter the 
contracting process without any appreciable benefit to consumers in 
terms of the content of form provisions. 
B. A Meaningful Assent Inquiry 
The primary strength of the sliding scale approach is its relaxation of 
the procedural unconscionability prong.  In applying the approach, 
 
extension of the sliding scale approach).   
316. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the psychological barriers to knowing assent). 
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courts should continue to refine the procedural unconscionability 
analysis to deemphasize factors relating to the personal characteristics 
of the contracting parties and the contracting environment that are 
unhelpful in the determination of whether a party’s consent is flawed.  
This adaptation of the procedural unconscionability prong should not 
continue to be obscured by traditional common sense notions that a 
party’s age, sophistication, or literacy level—or the particular form of 
the contract—are central to the determination of free consent.  Rather, 
courts’ analyses should be informed by interdisciplinary research 
regarding the actual realities of consumer decision making. 
In applying the sliding scale approach, courts should treat the 
procedural unconscionability prong as definitively established by the 
existence of a consumer form contract of adhesion without requiring 
additional factual evidence relating to either the consumer’s personal 
characteristics or the specifics of the contracting environment.  The 
weight of the social science literature establishes that free consent is 
undermined in consumer transactions wherever consumers are in fact 
powerless or believe themselves to be powerless to negotiate contract 
terms.  Moreover, it is these situations in which the risk of overreaching 
by merchants is greatest.  The availability of a meaningful opportunity 
to negotiate contract terms is therefore central to the procedural 
unconscionability analysis. 
Such an approach will require courts to refine their understanding of 
bargaining power and, in so doing, unify many conflicting definitions of 
the term “contract of adhesion.”  While courts and commentators agree 
that most form contracts are adhesionary, there is some disagreement 
about the characteristics of a particular form contract that justify the 
designation.317  The main ingredient of an adhesion contract is the 
inability to negotiate its terms.318  But questions remain as to whether 
inferior bargaining power is sufficient to destroy the opportunity to 
negotiate,319 or whether a complaining party must also show a lack of 
 
317. Compare Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1177 (delineating seven individual 
characteristics of adhesion contracts), with 1 PERILLO, CORBIN § 1.4 (describing, through 
examples, adhesion contracts as those that are rigid and negotiable only as to a few provisions), 
and 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
32:12, at 476–79 (4th ed. 1999) (defining adhesion contracts generally while citing to cases from 
several states on the unconscionability of various adhesion contracts). 
318. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 317, § 32:12, at 476–79 (defining an adhesion 
contract as “a contract entered without any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior 
bargaining power”).  
319. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, LP, 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
an agreement to arbitrate is procedurally unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because 
there is no opportunity for the parties to negotiate); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (stating that there was “little dispute” that an arbitration 
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reasonable market alternatives.320  Additionally, some courts have held 
that otherwise adhesionary contracts cease to be so if the adherent had 
an opportunity to review and reject individual terms after assenting to 
the contract as a whole.321 
Furthermore, in assessing procedural unconscionability, courts should 
resist the urge to find that evidence of heightened consent or disclosure 
protects an adhesionary contract from scrutiny.  Interdisciplinary 
research makes clear that tactics aimed at providing consumers with 
greater information do not alleviate the disparities in bargaining power 
and free choice that undermine consent to consumer contracts.322  When 
judges improperly equate increased information with increased freedom 
of choice, they risk insulating consumer contracts from appropriate 
judicial review.323 
Finding the procedural unconscionability prong established by the 
existence of a form contract of adhesion will also serve formalist norms.  
 
agreement was adhesive because “[i]t was imposed on employees as a condition of employment 
and there was no opportunity to negotiate”); Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 638 
(Ct. App. 2011) (“Absent unusual circumstances, evidence that one party has overwhelming 
bargaining power, drafts the contract, and presents it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is sufficient to 
demonstrate procedural unconscionability and require the court to reach the question of 
substantive unconscionability, even if the other party has market alternatives.” (citing Gatton v. 
T-Mobile USA, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Ct. App. 2007))). 
320. See, e.g., Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(stating that for a contract to be adhesionary, the consumer must lack “any realistic opportunity to 
look elsewhere for a more favorable contract; he must either adhere to the standardized 
agreement or forego the needed service” (quoting Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 
1178, 1185–86 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis added))).  
321. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that an arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable based on a thirty-day 
opt out clause); Clerk v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 09-05117, 2010 WL 364450, at *8–10 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) (same); Fluke v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 08-5776, 2009 WL 1437593, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009) (holding that an arbitration provision containing a sixty-day opt out 
clause was not unconscionable); Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) (same); Honig v. Comcast of Ga. I, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
(holding that an arbitration provision containing a class action waiver and providing for a thirty-
day opt out period was not unconscionable); Martin v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., No. 08-3322, 2008 
WL 4443021, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2008) (holding that an arbitration provision containing a 
fifteen-day opt out clause was not procedurally unconscionable); Sanders v. Comcast Cable 
Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008) 
(holding that an arbitration provision containing a class action waiver and providing for a thirty-
day opt out period was not unconscionable). 
322. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
323. See Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 854 (predicting that mandatory 
website disclosures will “backfire” under a sliding scale unconscionability analysis); WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-7 (noting that courts have not yet clearly addressed the question of 
whether “super-conscionable” behavior can insulate a contract from scrutiny); Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, supra note 161, at 739 (“[A]n empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the 
contract from being unconscionable, however problematic its terms.”). 
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By deemphasizing factors unrelated to bargaining power, courts will 
streamline the procedural unconscionability analysis, thus introducing 
much needed consistency into the unconscionability framework.  
Merchants may begin to make predictions regarding the scrutiny to 
which their contracts will be subjected on the basis of external factors 
related to the marketplace, rather than case-specific factors related to the 
personal characteristics of the consumers with whom they transact.  
Avoiding unnecessary analysis of the amount and quality of additional 
information provided by merchants to consumers also will prevent 
merchants from expending resources on disclosures that do little to aid 
in consumer decision making.  Thus, the sliding scale approach will 
contribute to economic efficiency. 
C. A Robust Fairness Inquiry 
Streamlining the procedural unconscionability analysis provides the 
additional benefit of permitting decision makers, commentators, and 
merchants to focus their attention on the substance of consumer 
contracts and to begin to develop clearer standards for the substantive 
unconscionability norm.  Of central importance is the question of “how 
much” substantive unconscionability is required before a term found in 
a standard contract of adhesion should be invalidated according to a 
sliding scale analysis.  In other words, does the existence of a form 
contract of adhesion establish a “large” quantum of procedural 
unconscionability sufficient to justify invalidation of an offending term 
on the basis of the mere unreasonableness of an offending provision?  
Or does the existence of a form contract of adhesion alone establish a 
“small” quantum of procedural unconscionability, which must be offset 
by extreme unfairness in order to justify relief? 
The disparities in bargaining power characteristic of most consumer 
form contracts of adhesion are serious in that they undermine consent to 
most form terms.  Therefore, when considering a form contract of 
adhesion, it is inappropriate for courts to continue to apply conventional 
standards for substantive unconscionability that would require offending 
provisions to “shock the conscience.”  Rather, the existence of a form 
contract of adhesion should “tip the scale” significantly toward an 
overall finding of unconscionability provided that the offending 
provisions are found to be “commercially unreasonable” in their one-
sidedness.  Recognition of the full extent to which assent is impaired by 
disparate bargaining power will empower courts to more freely consider 
the fairness of standardized terms without fear of overstepping formalist 
limitations on judicial interventionism.  However, in order to steer a 
middle course between fairness and formalism, courts should demand 
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evidence of significant unfairness to consumer interests before utilizing 
their supervisory power to control form content.  Consequently, courts 
should routinely look to the commercial purpose of the provision in 
question to determine whether it appropriately balances consumer and 
merchant concerns.  A substantive unconscionability inquiry too attuned 
to consumer preferences will have the undesirable effect of upsetting 
market stability and efficiency. 
Courts should also avoid the “reasonable expectations” of consumers 
when assessing substantive unconscionability.324  First, attention to 
reasonable expectations can result in the over-policing of commercially 
reasonable form terms.  A provision outside of the reasonable 
expectations of a consumer may impose only slightly on consumer 
interests while serving an important commercial purpose.  Although 
such a term may “surprise” consumers unfamiliar with industry 
practices, absent an unjustified burden on consumer interests, the term 
can hardly be considered sufficiently “oppressive” to justify relief.  
Therefore, such a provision included in a consumer form contract 
should not be subject to invalidation on the basis of substantive 
unconscionability.  A “reasonable expectations” inquiry may also result 
in the under-policing of form provisions if well-known but oppressive 
industry standards are allowed to escape judicial scrutiny. 
Finally, a true sliding scale approach to unconscionability could 
permit courts to more effectively police opportunistic or exploitative 
merchant behavior in the marketplace.  For example, although  
disclosure does little to ameliorate defects in consumer decision 
making, deliberate obfuscation by merchants may exacerbate 
deficiencies in consent.  When faced with such evidence of “bad acts” 
on the part of merchants, courts could conclude that this “greater” 
evidence of procedural unconscionability warrants non-enforcement of 
offensive provisions in the face of relatively mild unfairness in the 
substance of the provisions themselves.  Such an approach could be 
reserved for egregious cases of consumer exploitation so as to deter 
opportunistic behavior without unduly interfering in routine consumer 
transactions. 
 
324. A number of courts currently consider the “reasonable expectations” of the consumer as 
central to the question of substantive unconscionability.  See, e.g., Parada v. Superior Court, 98 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 755 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating that if a contract is one of adhesion, the next 
inquiry is whether it is “outside of ‘the reasonable expectations of the [weaker] part[y]’” (quoting 
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172–73 (Cal. 1981))); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. 
v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1086–87 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731 
(Ala. 2002)) (stating that “unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms” are an element of 
substantive unconscionability).  
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CONCLUSION 
The unconscionability doctrine will not single-handedly defeat the 
use of unfair terms in standard form contracts.  Moreover, the judicial 
process is not necessarily the ideal forum for the development of far-
reaching and long-lasting regulation of contracts.325  Courts develop the 
law slowly and on a case-by-case basis and cannot, acting alone, 
provide a comprehensive and timely solution to every problematic form 
term in the market.326 
However, unconscionability need not be a panacea in order to be an 
important and effective means of protecting consumers in the modern 
marketplace.  Though numerous reforms of, and alternatives to, the 
doctrine of unconscionability have been proposed, none have taken 
hold.  The most promising opportunity for improvement to the doctrine, 
the 2003 revision of Article 2, produced only cosmetic changes to the 
UCC’s unconscionability provision.327  Other legislative attempts to 
regulate standard form contracts in a comprehensive fashion have 
failed, often miserably.328  Industry-specific regulation of standardized 
terms has been marginally more successful, but these narrowly targeted 
schemes provide insufficient protection for consumers.329  Proposals for 
comprehensive administrative oversight of form contracts,330 though 
attractive on some levels, remain practically and politically 
unworkable.331  Judicial control of standard form contracts is therefore 
the best available means of providing the broadest cross section of 
meaningful consumer protection against one-sided provisions in 
standardized forms. 
 
325. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2002). 
326. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 771–72.  See Todd D. Rakoff, The 
Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1244–45 (2006) [hereinafter Rakoff, 
Boilerplate] (arguing that judges can only police the outer limits of problematic contracts, leaving 
the rest to be solved by the legislature and administrative agencies). 
327. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REV. 359, 384–85 (2001).  The drafting committee changed only one 
thing—the word “clause” to “term.”  This change resulted from the drafter’s desire to incorporate 
the word “term,” which was defined by Article 2 and is thus more meaningful and clear than 
“clause.”  Id.  
328. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 505–06 (discussing failed legislative proposals on the 
problem of standard form contracts and concluding that “it is highly unlikely that the legislature 
will solve the issue of assent to standard form contract terms”).  
329. See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 101–02 (discussing state legislative treatment 
of catfish products, health spa memberships, used watches, and dance lessons). 
330. See generally Bates, supra note 325 (advocating in favor of administrative regulation of 
standard form contracts). 
331. Rakoff, Boilerplate, supra note 326, at 1245 (discussing problems of “political will” 
affecting legislative and administrative oversight of standard form contracts).  
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Moreover, if effective legislation or administrative regulation of form 
contracts is ever to be achieved, some consensus must be reached 
regarding the appropriate limitations necessary to balance the interests 
of consumers and industry.  The judiciary has a crucial role to play in 
developing these limitations.  Judicial intervention in standard contracts 
has long served an important “signaling function”—calling attention to 
gaps in the law that have failed to protect consumers against 
overreaching.332  This judicial signaling function is exactly what 
Llewellyn had in mind when he suggested that the “courts’ business is 
eminently the marking out of the limits of the permissible . . . .”333  
American contract law is, after all, predominantly judge-made law.334 
Although unconscionability has fallen out of vogue among academic 
commentators,335 its continued and often creative use by courts 
demonstrates that it is still a vital doctrine, and one that is sufficiently 
flexible to respond to the realities of consumer contracting.  Academics 
will, and should, continue to search for optimal solutions to the standard 
contract dilemma.  In the meantime, judicial control of standardized 
terms should be fostered, encouraged, and guided toward the highest 
probability of success.  Professor Todd Rakoff recently cautioned that 
“the traditional analysis of what is ‘best’ may cause us to lose sight of 
what is only ‘better,’” and suggested that “[i]t is a mistake to assume 
that, because judges cannot do everything, therefore they can do, or 
ought to do, nothing.”336  A judicial solution to form contracts should 
not be discouraged simply because legislative and administrative 
solutions remain lacking.337  Instead, the critical role of the judiciary in 
shaping norms for contractual fairness should be embraced and 
empowered. 
 
332. Knapp, supra note 16, at 614.  Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that the increased use 
of the unconscionability doctrine to police arbitration provisions has discouraged in-house 
counsel from enforcing the arbitration provisions contained within their own forms.  Warkentine, 
supra note 5, at 546 (citing Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm, as Arbitration Costs Rise, In-
House Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, 92 A.B.A. J. 19 (Nov. 2006)).   
333. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 367 (quoting Llewellyn, Book 
Review, supra note 248, at 704). 
334. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 10.  
335. See Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 840 (“The unconscionability norm has 
unfortunately become a disfavored stepchild of contract law.”).  
336. Rakoff, Boilerplate, supra note 326, at 1245. 
337. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 842.  
